Emergence in Sociology

Abstract

The emergentist position that R. Keith Sawyer has formulated, nonreductive individualism, contains three propositions. First, that social characteristics must always be realized in individuals; second, that it is nevertheless possible to understand social properties as irreducible; and third, that therefore it is possible to demonstrate how social properties are able to exercise independent causal influences on individuals and their properties. It is demonstrated that Sawyer is not able to meet an objection that Kim has formulated against the analogous position in the philosophy of mind. In his defense of the claim of irreducibility Sawyer refers to Fodor’s argument about multiple realizability, but this line of argument cannot preserve the claim for downward causation because Fodor’s claim for irreducibility rests on assumptions that are not compatible with a systematic formulation of downward causation. The article proposes a reading of Fodor’s argument that is consistent with individualism but not with nonreductive individualism.

Advancing Multilevel Research Design

“…Referring to this distinction, Sawyer (2001) noted that ''sociological uses of emergence are contradictory and unstable; two opposed sociological paradigms both invoke the concept of emergence and draw opposed conclusions'' (p. 552). Indeed, these differing conceptualizations of emergence and the nature of the micromacro linkage are an ongoing source of debate in sociology (e.g., Greve, 2012).…”

Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation

“…If we substitute "individual" for "physical" and "social" for "psychological" or "mental", the parallels between these questions and ours become evident. Although these parallels have been recognized before (e.g., Pettit 1993;Sawyer 2002Sawyer , 2003Greve 2012), the relevant taxonomy of philosophical views and its logical structure are not as widely appreciated in the social sciences as they should be.…”

“…Thus they assume, contrary to our compatibility thesis, that supervenience individualism implies causal-explanatory individualism (see also Kincaid 1986). Since the argument for this claim is seldom carefully articulated (notable exceptions include Sawyer 2003 and Greve 2012), 13 it is worth reconstructing it and showing where it fails.…”

“…A reconciliation becomes possible once we see that there is not just one version of each view, but many, and that being an individualist in some respects is compatible with being a holist in others. Our proposal builds on ideas from the philosophy of mind (e.g., Putnam 1967;Fodor 1974;Stoljar 2009Stoljar , 2010Kim 1998Kim , 2005List and Menzies 2009) and the philosophy of social science (e.g., Macdonald and Pettit 1981;Kincaid 1986;Pettit 1993Pettit , 2003Tollefsen 2002;Sawyer 2002Sawyer , 2003List and Pettit 2011;Greve 2012), as well as the existing 3 debate in political science (e.g., Satz and Ferejohn 1994;Wendt 1999;Hay 2006;Peters 2012, ch. 1).…”

Emergence of human resilience in coastal ecosystems under environmental change

“…Downward causation of social properties is particularly contentious, and although researchers are increasingly providing empirical evidence from narrative inquiry, the debate is still rife on a theoretical level; discussions between Greve (2012) and Sawyer (2012) can be cited as an example. We are aware that our limited research cannot claim to empirically identify mechanisms of downward causation; nevertheless, we hope to throw some light on how resilience at a higher level, i.e., at the level of the SES, influences the actions and interactions at the lower, i.e., individual, levels.…”