Emerging Powers in WTO Negotiations: The Domestic Sources of Trade Policy Preferences

International Posturing amidst Domestic Neglect: India's Agricultural Policy Examined

“…The interests of the G-20 4 group in agricultural negotiations are primarily expansionary, focussed on increasing their exports, driven by the higher importance of agriculture in their total exports and their position as net agricultural exporters (Table 4). The group's primary interest lies in reversing protectionism in the developed world, while retaining some flexibility for developing countries in opening up their markets (Conceição-Heldt, 2013; Aggarwal, 2005). On the other hand, the G-33 group 5 is comprised of countries that largely have defensive positions in the negotiations, driven by a higher importance of agriculture in their total imports and a low to negative agricultural trade balance (Table 4).…”

“…This by itself may not be abnormal as the scenario may be true for most of the developed and developing countries. However, it is notable that India's aggressive posture on agriculture at the trade negotiations has threatened even to block the overall global trade liberalization process, despite India having a considerable stake in the services sector negotiations (Conceição-Heldt, 2013) which is of far greater significance to India's international trade.…”

“…The agricultural negotiations at the WTO Doha Round have signaled the rise of a new India in global economic governance. Scholars and commentators of international trade have variously commented as India being a ‘leader’ (Efstathopoulos, 2012), ‘emerging power’ (Conceição-Heldt, 2013), or a ‘great power’ (Narlikar, 2011), based on their analysis of India's role in global agricultural trade negotiations. There is near scholarly consensus that India has played an active role in shaping the agriculture negotiations at the WTO by submitting detailed proposals, building and leading coalitions with other developing nations, and adopting tough unilateral positions (or veto) to pursue its strategic interests.…”

“…Most scholars depict India's domestic agriculture situation as one of crisis and deep distress, characterized by an alarming rate of farmer suicides across the country (Reddy and Mishra, 2009; Deshpande and Arora, 2010). While there have been studies that argue that India's domestic factors influence international agricultural policy (Priyadarshi, 2004; Purohit, 2015; Conceição-Heldt, 2013; Narlikar, 2006), they often remain inadequate in explaining this apparent contradiction between India's international negotiating positions and the domestic policy. This paper attempts to fill this gap and locate the convergence and contradictions between India's domestic and international agricultural policies.…”

“…Extant literature on international trade acknowledges that domestic compulsions are driving India's negotiating stance. It recognizes the importance of India's 600 million agriculture-dependent population, along with concerns around food security for a large impoverished population, as being central to India's political dynamics and its democratic legitimacy (Narlikar, 2006; Conceição-Heldt, 2013; Clapp, 2015). However, we argue that with a decline in the influence of farmers or rural agrarian elite in the domestic political economy, there is a limited political constituency for serving and extending the interests of India's agricultural producers.…”