Enforcement and Spectrum Sharing: Case Studies of Federal-Commercial Sharing

Altamimi, Mohammed Alsakran; Weiss, Martin B. H.; McHenry, Mark P.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2241729

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…boundary) of these protection areas is based on several technical factors, including transmit power, time variations, receiver susceptibility to interference, propagation effects of radio waves, among others (Bhattarai et al ., 2015). Note that, even though the boundaries of these ‘protection zones’ have been revised on multiple occasions by the FCC and NTIA, they are still static (Altamimi et al ., 2013), hence representing a centralized governance approach. This centralized approach has the potential of reducing the value and incentives for new entrants, and it disregards important factors that impact local-sharing conditions.…”

Section: Sharing Framework and Self-governance Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Based on the definitions of EZs and CZs, several authors (Altamimi et al ., 2013; Bhattarai et al ., 2015, 2017) have designed methods to specify the characteristics of this Federal–Commercial sharing environment. In particular, authors have sought to develop methods for creating and sizing both restriction zones.…”

Section: Sharing Framework and Self-governance Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spectrum anarchy: why self-governance of the radio spectrum works better than we think

Bustamante

Gomez

Murtazashvili

et al. 2020

Journal of Institutional Economics

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The exploitation of radio-electric spectrum bands for wireless transmission purposes has some features of the commons: it is subject to congestion and conflict without rules governing its use. The Coasean approach is to assign private property rights to overcome the tragedy of the spectrum commons. The process of assigning these rights is still centralized, with governments assigning property rights through agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission and National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the USA. We consider the possibility of self-governance of the spectrum. We use insights from the study of common pool resources governance to analyze the emergence of property rights to spectrum in a ‘government-less’ environment in which norms, rules, and enforcement mechanisms are solely the product of the repeated interactions among participants in the network. Our case study considers the spectrum-sharing arrangement in the 1,695–1,710 MHz band. Using agent-based modeling (ABM), we show that self-governance of the spectrum can work and under what conditions it is likely to improve the efficiency of the allocation of property rights.

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Section: Sharing Framework and Self-governance Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Sharing Framework and Self-governance Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spectrum anarchy: why self-governance of the radio spectrum works better than we think

Bustamante

Gomez

Murtazashvili

et al. 2020

Journal of Institutional Economics

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Dimensions of cooperative spectrum sharing: Rights and enforcement

Liu

Gomez

Weiss

2014

2014 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DYSPAN)

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Abstract-Sharing of radio spectrum requires a careful and nuanced understanding of the rights of incumbents and spectrum entrants. In addition, the dynamics of stakeholders can be understood by examining how various rights are arranged (and rearranged) among them. Importantly, understanding the rights and their distribution is the predicate to developing rational and useful enforcement approaches.In this paper, we show that spectrum sharing involves a rearrangement of the rights associated with radio spectrum among stakeholders. We show how this rearrangement of rights implies the definition of new bundles of rights, appropriate to each particular sharing scenario. We discover these rights -and their (re)arrangement) -by examining several cases of spectrum use. We begin with the rights associated with exclusive use and proceed to consider rights arrangement in commons and different spectrum sharing configurations. Further, in the case of commons, we explicitly examine how governance of commons can affect the rights distribution in spectrum. In each case, the bundles of rights associated with each stakeholder changes.New bundles of rights have consequences, not only on the behavior of spectrum users but also on the enforcement process. Our examination of the bundles of rights shows that each rearrangement results in different approaches to enforcement. We demonstrate this by revisiting enforcement in the cases we examine.

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Ex-Post Enforcement in Spectrum Sharing

Malki

Weiss

2014

SSRN Journal

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Spectrum sharing is emerging as a key strategy for future wireless communications systems. Enforcement is a requirement for spectrum sharing to protect the incumbent of the spectrum from bad interference. Practical schemes have linked together ex-ante and ex-post enforcement. The design of the overall enforcement system may give more emphasis to one or the other. The emphasis in commercial-government sharing in the United States has been on ex-ante measures [4,5]. Determining the role of ex-post enforcement in a spectrum sharing scheme is of significant importance since spectrum sharing will inevitably result in interference events. To evaluate the role of the ex-post enforcement approach, we will consider numerical examples where we compare the cost of the ex-post only enforcement to the cost of the ex-ante only enforcement on one of the suggested bands for spectrum sharing (1695-1710 MHz). The cost of the ex-post enforcement in our model depends on the penalty value that Primary User (PU) uses to control interference events and the probability of detecting the interference. The penalty value depends on two factors which are changeable and unchangeable enforcement costs. The cost of the ex-post only enforcement has two variables that affect it, which are probability of detection; and the changeable enforcement cost. The numerical results show how these two variables affect one another, and their effect on the radius of the penalty zone. It also shows the maximum changeable enforcement cost that would be feasible.

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Enforcement and Spectrum Sharing: Case Studies of Federal-Commercial Sharing

Abstract: To promote economic growth and unleash the potential of wireless broadband, there is a need to introduceii

Cited by 4 publications

References 5 publications

Spectrum anarchy: why self-governance of the radio spectrum works better than we think

Spectrum anarchy: why self-governance of the radio spectrum works better than we think

Dimensions of cooperative spectrum sharing: Rights and enforcement

Ex-Post Enforcement in Spectrum Sharing

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