Enforcing fair cooperation in production-inventory settings with heterogeneous agents

Guardiola, Luis A.; Meca, Ana; Puerto, Justo

doi:10.1007/s10479-021-04083-3

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…The broadcasting problem is an instance of resource allocation. Other well known instances to which the literature has paid attention are: airport problems (e.g., Littlechild and Owen, 1973), bankruptcy problems (e.g., O'Neill, 1982;Thomson, 2019a), telecommunications problems (e.g., van den Nouweland et al, 1996), minimum cost spanning tree problems (e.g., Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2021), transport problems (e.g., Algaba et al 2019;Estañ et al 2021), inventory problems (e.g., Guardiola et al, 2021), liability problems with rooted tree networks (e.g. Oishi et al, 2023), knapsack problems (e.g., Arribillaga and Bergantiños 2023), pooling games (Schlicher et al 2020), m-attribute games (Özen et al, 2022), urban consolidation centers (Hezarkhani et al, 2019), and scheduling problems with delays (Gonçalves-Dosantos et al, 2020) .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anonymity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues

Bergantiños

Moreno‐Ternero

2023

Ann Oper Res

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We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues axiomatically. Our key axiom is anonymity, the classical impartiality axiom. Other impartiality axioms already studied in broadcasting problems are equal treatment of equals, weak equal treatment of equals and symmetry. We study the relationship between all impartiality axioms. Besides we combine anonymity with other axioms that have been considered in the literature. Some combinations give rise to new characterizations of well-known rules. The family of generalized split rules is characterized with anonymity, additivity and null team. The concede-and-divide rule is characterized with anonymity, additivity and essential team. Other and combinations characterize new rules that had not been considered before. We provide three characterizations in which three axioms are the same (anonymity, additivity, and order preservation) and the fourth one is different (maximum aspirations, weak upper bound, and non-negativity). Depending on the fourth axiom we obtain three different families of rules. In all of them concede-and-divide plays a central role.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anonymity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues

Bergantiños

Moreno‐Ternero

2023

Ann Oper Res

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“…The broadcasting problem is an instance of resource allocation. Other well known instances to which the literature has paid attention are: airport problems (e.g., Littlechild and Owen, 1973), bankruptcy problems (e.g., O'Neill, 1982; Thomson, 2019a), telecommunications problems (e.g., van den Nouweland et al 1996), minimum cost spanning tree problems (e.g., Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2021), transport problems (e.g., Algaba et al 2019, Estañ et al 2021), inventory problems (e.g., Guardiola et al, 2021), liability problems with rooted tree networks (e.g. Oishi et al, 2023), knapsack problems (e.g., Arribillaga and Bergantiños 2023), pooling games (Schlicher et al, 2020), m-attribute games ( Özen et al, 2022), urban consolidation centers (Hezarkhani et al, 2019), and scheduling problems with delays (Gonçalves-…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monotonicity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues

Bergantiños

Moreno‐Ternero

2022

European Journal of Operational Research

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“…This fact motivates the name of Owen point for this core-allocation on PIgames. Recently, Guardiola et al (2021a) introduce new core allocations for PIgames improving the weaknesses of the Owen point (it may be seen as an altruistic allocation for any players) and study the structure and complexity of the core of PIgames. The main difference between the ELS-games by Van den Heuvel et al (2007) and PI-games by Guardiola et al (2009) is that the former considers set up costs but assume that costs are homogeneous for all players in each period.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of consolidated periods in heterogeneous lot-sizing games

Guardiola

Meca

Puerto

2021

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We consider a cooperative game defined by an economic lot-sizing problem with heterogeneous costs over a finite time horizon, in which each firm faces demand for a single product in each period and coalitions can pool orders. The model of cooperation works as follows: ordering channels and holding and backlogging technologies are shared among the members of the coalitions. This implies that each firm uses the best ordering channel and holding technology provided by the participants in the consortium. That is, they produce, hold inventory, pay backlogged demand and make orders at the minimum cost of the coalition members. Thus, firms aim at satisfying their demand over the planing horizon with minimal operation cost. Our contribution is to show that there exist fair allocations of the overall operation cost among the firms so that no group of agents profit from leaving the consortium. Then we propose a parametric family of cost allocations and provide sufficient conditions for this to be a stable family against coalitional defections of firms. Finally, we focus on those periods of the time horizon that are consolidated and we analyze their effect on the stability of cost allocations.

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Enforcing fair cooperation in production-inventory settings with heterogeneous agents

Cited by 6 publications

References 25 publications

Anonymity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues

Anonymity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues

Monotonicity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues

The effect of consolidated periods in heterogeneous lot-sizing games

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