Enhanced rationality in autism spectrum disorder

Rozenkrantz, Liron; D’Mello, Anila M.; Gabrieli, John D. E.

doi:10.1016/j.tics.2021.05.004

Cited by 47 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 99 publications

(116 reference statements)

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“…In contrast, we consistently found an association between autism and lower self-reported intuition across Studies 2–4. Although this aligns with previously reported findings of lower self-reported intuitive thinking in autism (see Rozenkrantz et al, 2021), this is inconsistent with our otherwise compelling evidence for no relationship between autism and performance-based intuition. One interpretation for this pattern is that self-reported intuition captures intuitive thinking across a wider range of contexts.…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 99%

“…Equally, enhanced deliberation may confer an autistic strength enabling, for example, more rational thinking, optimal real-life decision outcomes, and enhanced moral reasoning. Consequently, dual process theory may have important practical implications, with potential to inform interventions for managing social communication difficulties in autism, while also speaking to recent advocacy for harnessing autistic strengths in applied settings (e.g., Huntley et al, 2019; Rozenkrantz et al, 2021). More generally, better evidence and understanding of enhanced deliberative thinking as an autism-related strength may improve societal attitudes toward autistic people, by working against the historical focus on autism-related difficulties.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rethinking fast and slow processing in autism.

Taylor¹,

Farmer²,

Livingston³

et al. 2022

Journal of Psychopathology and Clinical Science

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Following the popularity of dual process models in social and cognitive psychology, there is major interest in the possibility that autism is associated with impaired “fast” intuitive thinking but enhanced “slow” or “rational” deliberative thinking. If correct, this has great potential to help understand various strengths and difficulties characteristic of autism. Previous empirical investigations of this phenomenon, however, are marred by concerns about the measurement of intuitive and deliberative processing, as well as broader problems in clinical psychological science (e.g., small underpowered studies, lack of replication). Making a step change, we conducted four large-scale studies to examine dual processing in autism, including a preregistered comparison of 200 autistic and nonautistic adults. Participants completed contemporary cognitive and self-report measures of intuitive and deliberative processing, as well as a psychometrically robust measure of general cognitive ability. Except for lower self-reported intuitive thinking, we found no unique contributions of autism to intuitive or deliberative thinking across all four studies, as evidenced by frequentist and Bayesian analyses. Overall, these studies indicate that intuitive and deliberative thinking is neither enhanced nor particularly impaired in relation to autism. We deliberate on the implications of these findings for theories of autism and future investigation of strengths and difficulties in autistic people.

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Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking fast and slow processing in autism.

Taylor¹,

Farmer²,

Livingston³

et al. 2022

Journal of Psychopathology and Clinical Science

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“…A consistent observation is that some autistic individuals 1 do not rely on past information to flexibly adjust their behavior and adapt to changing situations (Cannon et al, 2021). This observation has shaped predictive coding theoretical frameworks of ASD and may explain challenges (Pellicano and Burr, 2012;Lawson et al, 2014;Sinha et al, 2014;Van de Cruys et al, 2014) and strengths characteristics of ASD (Rozenkrantz et al, 2021). Autistic self-reports also describe social cognition as an explicit process.…”

Section: Linking Adaptive Prediction and Social Cognition In Asdmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The majority of studies examining social cognition, the cerebellum, and adaptive prediction abilities in ASD focus on deficits or challenges in these domains. However, reduced reliance on predictions and past experience can be a strength in ASD, for example in the domains of reasoning, decision making, and cognitive biases (see Rozenkrantz et al, 2021). Despite this, few studies have taken strengths-based approaches when assessing how cerebellar contributions to adaptive prediction may play a role in the heterogeneous profile of strengths and challenges in ASD.…”

Section: Altered Cerebellar Adaptive Prediction and Strengths In Asdmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cerebellar Contributions to Social Cognition in ASD: A Predictive Processing Framework

Frosch

Mittal

D’Mello

2022

Front. Integr. Neurosci.

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Functional, structural, and cytoarchitectural differences in the cerebellum are consistently reported in Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Despite this, the mechanisms governing cerebellar contributions to ASD, particularly within the sociocognitive domain, are not well understood. Recently, it has been suggested that several core features of ASD may be associated with challenges creating and using prior expectations or predictions to rapidly adapt to changing stimuli or situations, also known as adaptive prediction. Importantly, neuroimaging, clinical, and animal work find that the cerebellum supports adaptive prediction in both motor and non-motor domains. Perturbations to the cerebellum via injury or neuromodulation have been associated with impairments in predictive skills. Here, we review evidence for a cerebellar role in social cognition and adaptive prediction across individuals with and without ASD.

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“…In clinical populations, the optimism bias has been shown to be absent, e.g., in people with depression (Garrett et al, 2014;Korn et al, 2014), autism spectrum disorder (Kuzmanovic et al, 2019;Rozenkrantz et al, 2021), and borderline personality disorder (Korn et al, 2016). Instead, several mental disorders are related to the persistence of disorder-specific beliefs despite disconfirmatory evidence as indicated in research social anxiety (Koban et al, 2017), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Moritz & Jelinek, 2009;Moritz & Pohl, 2009), psychosis (Buchy et al, 2007;Woodward et al, 2006Woodward et al, , 2008, and persistent somatic symptoms (Rief et al, 2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

No Evidence for the Involvement of Cognitive Immunisation in Updating Beliefs About the Self in Three Non-Clinical Samples

Kube

Glombiewski

2021

Cogn Ther Res

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Background Cognitive immunisation against disconfirmatory evidence (i.e., devaluing expectation-disconfirming information through cognitive mechanisms) has recently been discussed as an obstacle to the revision of dysfunctional beliefs in mental disorders such as depression. Yet, it is unclear whether cognitive immunisation is also involved in belief updating in non-clinical samples. Methods Using a three-group modulation protocol (promotion vs. inhibition of cognitive immunisation vs. control group), we examined how cognitive immunisation influences belief updating in response to performance feedback in three non-clinical samples. In Experiments 1 (N = 99) and 2 (N = 93), participants received unexpectedly negative feedback, whereas participants from Experiment 3 (N = 118) received unexpectedly positive feedback. Depressive symptoms and dispositional optimism were examined as additional predictors of belief updating. Results In all experiments, participants adjusted their expectations in line with the feedback received, but this effect was not influenced by the cognitive immunisation manipulation. In Experiment 3, expectation change remained stable over 2 weeks. Depressive symptoms were associated with a reduced integration of positive feedback, but not with an increased sensitivity to negative feedback. Conclusions Whereas previous research has shown that cognitive immunisation contributes to persistent beliefs in clinical populations, the present findings suggest that it does not affect belief updating in non-clinical samples.

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Enhanced rationality in autism spectrum disorder

Cited by 47 publications

References 99 publications

Rethinking fast and slow processing in autism.

Rethinking fast and slow processing in autism.

Cerebellar Contributions to Social Cognition in ASD: A Predictive Processing Framework

No Evidence for the Involvement of Cognitive Immunisation in Updating Beliefs About the Self in Three Non-Clinical Samples

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