Enterprise investment, local government intervention and coal overcapacity: The case of China

Zhang, Yanfang; Zhang, Ming; Liu, Yue; Nie, Rui

doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2016.11.036

Cited by 108 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Such a vector-oriented approach will help accelerate the structural adjustment of the manufacturing industry and form investment priorities. It is important to take into account industrial production cycles that affect the predicted multiplier effect [17][18][19][20]. The priority remains the maintenance and technological improvement of the industrial potential, first of all, of the strategic branches of the electric power industry, machine building, and the building materials industry.…”

Section: Figure 2: Change In Direct Investmуent Components (Million Umentioning

confidence: 99%

Actual Problems of Implementation of Investment Industrial Entrepreneurial Potential.

Kurpayanidi¹

2020

Theoretical & Applied Science

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Section: Figure 2: Change In Direct Investmуent Components (Million Umentioning

confidence: 99%

Actual Problems of Implementation of Investment Industrial Entrepreneurial Potential.

Kurpayanidi¹

2020

Theoretical & Applied Science

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“…Therefore, overcapacity always brought about vicious competition, severe waste of resources, imbalance between supply and demand, plunging coal prices and overall financial loss of coal enterprises [13]. If this problem cannot be solved in a timely and effective manner, it will not only affect the high-quality development of the coal industry, but also hinder the optimisation of China's energy structure and the prosperity and stability of the national economy [14,15]. Correct identification of the causes is the prerequisite and basis for addressing overcapacity.…”

Section: Excess Capacity and Its Causesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the late 1990s in particular, China's small coal mines boomed "everywhere". In order not to allow more new entrants to enter the market to share the benefits, they adopt the entry deterrence strategy and even vicious competition, resulting in the waste of coal resources and the destruction of the ecological environment, along with an over-supply and overcapacity in coal production [14,22].…”

Section: Excess Capacity and Its Causesmentioning

confidence: 99%

De-Capacity Policy Effect on China’s Coal Industry

et al. 2019

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Overcapacity in China's coal industry has serious negative impacts on the rational allocation of coal resources and stable operation of the national economy. Since 2016, the Chinese government has implemented a series of de-capacity policies to optimise coal production capacity. Timely policy effect assessment is of great significance to the government to guide high-quality development of the coal industry. This paper first reviews the dilemma encountered by China's coal industry prior to 2016, and then analyses the progress and effect of coal industry de-capacity. The main results are as follows: (1) The capacity reduction is mainly distributed in the central and southwestern regions. Most of the coal mines are state-owned, and there is a prominent worker resettlement problem.(2) The capacity optimisation policy has accelerated the implementation of the overall spatial planning of China's coal supply. China's coal production centre has shifted from the central and eastern regions to the west, and the industry's high-quality development pattern has taken shape.(3) China's coal industrial profitability has constantly been improving, industry concentration has increased significantly, and coal mining has become safer. (4) Due to the regional heterogeneity, the de-capacity policy effect has significant differences in coal production capacity and employee reduction in various regions. Finally, regarding the optimisation of China's coal production capacity, some policy implications are given.

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“…Local government should focus on formulating fair industry rules for online car-hailing service and taxi companies, clarifying the legal relationship between the parties, improving the risk control of market subjects, improving the overall regulatory framework and system, and establishing a national online car-hailing service monitoring platform so that these companies can fully share and dock with local government departmental data platforms and to protect the all-round development of local government information governance systems [44]. Local governments should also actively listen to and widely solicit views from all parties; research and formulate future development planning and policies under national and local laws and governance; regulate qualifications, document issuance, and filing; organize and conduct the evaluation of service quality among enterprises; help enterprises establish and improve their information security and management systems, registration systems, and comprehensive credit evaluation systems; provide information security, confidentiality responsibility, and punishment systems; standardize information collection, processing, storage, and exchange; and implement dynamic supervision [45].…”

Section: Conclusion and Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Local Government Governance and Enterprise Social Responsibility Behaviors under the Perspective of Cournot Duopoly Competition: Analyzing Taxi Companies and Online Car-Hailing Service Companies

Zhang

2018

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Clarifying the rational choice strategy of local governments and enterprises is crucial for promoting control on the failure of taxis and online car-hailing service companies to fulfill their social responsibilities. The local government can reduce the negative externalities and irresponsibility of such companies by improving the regulatory system; thus, it is important to build a governance model that bridges tradition and modernity. This paper, on the basis of summarizing the achievements of the predecessors, builds a mixed dynamic game model among the local government, online car-hailing service companies, and taxi companies; analyzes the relationship between local government preference, execution, and governance of irresponsible enterprise behaviors; and analyzes the equilibrium solution between local government and duopoly enterprises behavior game deeply. The results show that the key to governance irresponsible companies is to make the punishment cost higher than the cost savings for irresponsible behaviors; no matter what the preference of the local government no-governance of online car-hailing service companies' irresponsible behaviors may persist; and local government ambivalence when regulating irresponsible companies is derived from the complex relationship between social benefits and company interests. Finally, through the analysis of the equilibrium results for the above model, this paper provides suggestions on regulatory policies so as to provide theoretical support and a decision-making basis for establishing scientific, universal, and feasible governance policies and offering responsible methods of urban transportation.

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Enterprise investment, local government intervention and coal overcapacity: The case of China

Cited by 108 publications

References 36 publications

Actual Problems of Implementation of Investment Industrial Entrepreneurial Potential.

Actual Problems of Implementation of Investment Industrial Entrepreneurial Potential.

De-Capacity Policy Effect on China’s Coal Industry

Research on Local Government Governance and Enterprise Social Responsibility Behaviors under the Perspective of Cournot Duopoly Competition: Analyzing Taxi Companies and Online Car-Hailing Service Companies

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