Environmental Dilemmas Revisited: Structural Consequences from the Angle of Institutional Ergonomics

Beckenkamp, Martin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1337447

SSRN Journal

2009

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1337447

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Environmental Dilemmas Revisited: Structural Consequences from the Angle of Institutional Ergonomics

Martin Beckenkamp

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Cited by 14 publications

References 30 publications

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Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

Gizatulina¹,

Hellwig²

2010

Journal of Economic Theory

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For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that e¢ cient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents' payo¤s cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs, i.e., even if the so-called BDP property ("Beliefs Determine Preferences") of Neeman (2004) does not hold. The contrary result of Neeman (2004) rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them.JEL Classi…cation: D40, D44, D80, D82

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Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

Gizatulina¹,

Hellwig²

2010

Journal of Economic Theory

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Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance

Traxler

2012

Journal of Public Economics

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A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare assessment. We find that the inefficiency in the voting equilibrium is the lower, the higher the average level of tax avoidance in the economy, or equivalently, the lower the median voter's amount of avoidance. The result holds for endogenous avoidance and labor choice and, under certain conditions, for an endogenous enforcement policy.JEL classification: H26; D72; D6.

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How Rational is International Law?

Petersen

2009

SSRN Journal

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Environmental Dilemmas Revisited: Structural Consequences from the Angle of Institutional Ergonomics

Cited by 14 publications

References 30 publications

Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance

How Rational is International Law?

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