Episodic remembering and affective metacognition

Abstract

The aim of this article is to clarify, in the light of philosophical and psychological research on affective metacognition, the nature of the episodic feeling, which determines what it is like to remember or relive in one’s mind an episode from one’s own past. The hypothesis defended is that the episodic feeling is a metacognitive experience, which rests on mechanisms that monitor the source of the relevant information. Although there is presently no direct psychological evidence for the existence of the episodic feeling, studies on a specific kind of feelings of knowing, which are especially tied to episodic memory, can help cast light on the nature of the episodic feeling. Overall, the hypothesis that the episodic feeling is a metacognitive experience squares well with a general theory of metacognition. It leads to a two-tiered account of episodic remembering. On this account, the phenomenology characteristic of episodic remembering is extrinsic to the memory state itself. When we have a memory, it feels episodic only if it is properly monitored at the metacognitive level. However, an episodic memory can be attributed to a subject in the absence of an episodic feeling. The memory itself can be a mere unconscious mental condition, as in some cases of tip-of-the-tongue experiences, or its content can be transparent to the subject via a conscious imagining.

Autonoesis and episodicity: Perspectives from philosophy of memory

“…5 Compare Bernecker (2008) on memory markers. 6 In more recent work, Dokic (2014aDokic ( , 2021 has defended a metacognitive account of autonoesis. See Section 4.…”

“…Dokic's use of the term should not be confused with Tulving's: Dokic's concept of a noetic feeling applies not only to noesis in Tulving's sense, but also to autonoesis and to other feelings potentially involved in remembering, as well as to a variety of metacognitive feelings involved in cognitive processes other than remembering. 10 Though see Dokic (2021), where Dokic argues that the episodic feeling of knowing also concerns the subject's capacity to retrieve more information in episodic memory (see also Section 4.1.2 for discussion). One concern with this claim is that it is unclear how, in light of this new characterization, the episodic feeling of knowing is to be distinguished from the semantic feeling of knowing.…”

“…In response, Dokic (2021) has argued that a key aspect of the phenomenology of episodic remembering is that it involves a sense that more information is available for retrieval, which can happen not only before but also after content is retrieved. When, for instance, one remembers one's last meal in a restaurant and conjures up an image of oneself waiting to be seated, one's memory is accompanied by a sense that more information is available for retrieval—information about the dish that one ordered, the layout of the restaurant, and so on.…”

“…6 6 In more recent work, Dokic (2014a, 2021) has defended a metacognitive account of autonoesis. See Section 4. …”

“…10 10 Though see Dokic (2021), where Dokic argues that the episodic feeling of knowing also concerns the subject's capacity to retrieve more information in episodic memory (see also Section 4.1.2 for discussion). One concern with this claim is that it is unclear how, in light of this new characterization, the episodic feeling of knowing is to be distinguished from the semantic feeling of knowing. …”