EU(ropean) Differentiated Defence Integration

Abstract

Even though the need to improve European joint defence capacity has been on the agenda of both NATO and the EU, individually and in partnership for over a decade, it has not yet been fully achieved. The Russian invasion was a brutal reminder that Europe is still largely dependent on the US for its security. This added further momentum to the process of building up a stronger European defence capacity, which has already been ongoing for a decade. The EU’s adoption of the Strategic Compass in March 2022, shortly after the invasion, is crucial in this context. It had been under development for some time (since June 2020) but had to be rewritten due to the invasion. It was intended to represent a great leap forward, as it was to present an action plan towards 2030. Due to recent events, member states were more committed than ever to delivering joint defence capacity, and they sought to do so through greater flexibility, investing more and more efficiently, and cooperating more closely with partners.The geopolitical situation makes Europe more committed and obliged than ever to build a stronger European capacity. Over the past 15 years, a series of different initiatives, at different levels and in different formats, have been launched with this in mind. A recurring question, however, has been whether these many different processes and initiatives result in a more fragmented and complicated European security structure, with unnecessary duplication as a result. Or whether they, through various cooperation agreements and coordination efforts, contribute to a more flexible and stronger European defence structure, where formal structures are less important than commitment to different initiatives. The aim of this chapter is to provide an answer.