European Works Council at General Motors Europe: bargaining efficiency in regime competition?

Abstract

The European Works Council (EWC) at General Motors Europe is frequently cited as one of the few examples of an efficient body of employee representation at a European level within a multinational company. Despite the increasing threat of social dumping in the enlarged Europe, the EWC was able to agree with management the terms of compulsory European minimum standards for defensive employment and competitiveness pacts, thereby restricting the effects of coercive comparisons between factories located in different countries. In this article, we focus on this experience and illuminate the tensions of 'micro-corporatism' caught between international solidarity and regime competition.

European Works Councils as Risk Communities: The Case of General Motors

“…In parallel, the body became involved in the process of investment allocation for the new Vectra/Saab ranges (Bartmann, 2005). This trend has recently been reinforced through active EWC participation in the 'site selection process' for the next generation of 'Delta' (Astra) vehicles involving the plants in Bochum, Antwerp, Ellesmere Port, Trollhättan and Gliwice (Banyuls and Haipeter, 2007). Most of these negotiations were accompanied by 'European action days', with token strikes or demonstrations in the different European plants.…”

“…Today, it is widely regarded as being a paradigm of EWC effectiveness, hardly matched in any other firm (Carley and Hall, 2006;Whittall et al, 2007). There are good descriptive accounts of the dynamics culminating in the conclusion of several framework agreements since 2000 between the EWC and GM's European management; they reveal the achievements yet also the limits of cross-border union cooperation, as EWC negotiations did not replace but supplemented local and national bargaining (Banyuls and Haipeter, 2007;da Costa and Rehfeldt, 2007;Pulignano, 2006;Rehfeldt, 2004). However, interpretations offered for the 'vanguard' role of the EWC are neither fully convincing empirically (see below) nor theoretically grounded.…”

European Works Councils during the financial and economic crisis: Activation, stagnation or disintegration?

“…From our point of view, EWCs with a high 'output' are those which have concluded agreements, as at Volkswagen, GME and Ford (Banyuls et al, 2008;Fetzer, 2008a). Yet, it has been argued that one has to distinguish between activity and outcome, and that both have to be evaluated on the basis of the 'need to organize' (Hertwig et al, 2011).…”

“…In several studies, a mixture of factors has been identified. In the case of GME, for example, studies have noted the existence of a European management level, overcapacities and parallel production, trade union support, a learning process among EWC members and the strong national system of German labour relations to explain how this EWC became a 'bargaining actor' (Banyuls et al, 2008). Fetzer (2008a) uses a notion of 'risk communities', unified by 'a shared sense of vulnerability' arising from a common and evenly spread threat of restructuring.…”

“…Crises, it has been argued, breed a growing need to organize, and under certain conditions employees recognize the potential of collective representation to articulate their interests (Hertwig et al, 2011;Kerckhofs, 2015;Kotthoff, 2007;Müller et al, 2004). With regard to cross-border representation, the case of General Motors Europe (GME) illustrates how a European Works Council (EWC) can become a powerful actor when facing management threats of relocation and redundancies (Banyuls et al, 2008). Conversely, crisis may also disrupt existing representational practice.…”