Evidential Support and Contraposition

Rott, Hans

doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00628-5

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…The next question is whether the above objections against Crupi and Iacona's original Chrysippus test still apply to their amended version. First we note that since the truth condition of (CT2) is a strengthening of the truth condition of (CT1), Rott's (2022b) The new question thus is whether the amended truth condition is sufficient for expressing evidential support. Example 2 cannot be used any more since the antecedent and the consequent of (3), i.e., ¬t and r have different truth values in the single most plausible ("closest") world tr.…”

Section: Towards More Complex Logical Forms: Crupi and Iacona's Recen...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…facts) stating that for every world satisfying A ∧ ¬C there is a closer/more plausible world satisfying A ∧ C.3 Cf (Rott, 2022b),. where the principles are formulated in the metalanguage, without embeddings of conditionals, in order to make consistent place for the view that conditionals do not have truth values.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…I am grateful to an anonymous referee for alerting me to this point.5 This term, which I first found in(Gomes, 2019, p. 55), has been used in German linguistics for concessives sinceErben (1958, p. 131, "Bindewörter des 'unzureichenden Grundes'"). The classical examples of Adams, Stalnaker and Lewis are recapped in(Rott, 2022b).6 In this paper, I take it that concessive conditionals are equivalent to, and can be rephrased as, conditionals featuring even if in the antecedent or still in the consequent. In order to avoid ambiguities, I will always formulate concessives as even if conditionals.…”

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confidence: 99%

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On the Logical Form of Evidential Conditionals

Rott

2023

LLP

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The dominant analyses of the logical form of natural-language conditionals take them to be “suppositional conditionals”. The latter are true or accepted if the consequent is true/accepted on the supposition of the antecedent. But this can happen although the antecedent is completely irrelevant (or even somewhat adverse) to the consequent. In natural-language conditionals, however, the antecedent is typically meant to support or be evidence for the consequent. The logical form of conditionals will thus be more complex than the suppositional theory would have it. Recently some suggestions as to what this logical form might look like have been made. In this paper, I critically discuss Vincenzo Crupi and Andrea Iacona’s account of “evidential conditionals”, including its recent amendments.

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Section: Towards More Complex Logical Forms: Crupi and Iacona's Recen...mentioning

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On the Logical Form of Evidential Conditionals

Rott

2023

LLP

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Conditionals: Inferentialism Explicated

Crupi,

Iacona

2024

Erkenn

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According to the view of conditionals named inferentialism, a conditional holds when its consequent can be inferred from its antecedent. This paper identifies some major challenges that inferentialism has to face, and uses them to assess three accounts of conditionals: one is the classical strict account, the other two have recently been proposed by Douven and Rott. As will be shown, none of the three proposals meets all challenges in a fully satisfactory way. We argue through novel formal results that a variation of the evidential account of conditionals suggested by Crupi and Iacona is the most promising candidate to develop inferentialism in a coherent formal framework.

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The Implicative Conditional

Raidl,

Gomes

2023

J Philos Logic

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This paper investigates the implicative conditional, a connective intended to describe the logical behavior of an empirically defined class of natural language conditionals, also named implicative conditionals, which excludes concessive and some other conditionals. The implicative conditional strengthens the strict conditional with the possibility of the antecedent and of the contradictory of the consequent. $${p\Rightarrow q}$$ p ⇒ q is thus defined as $${\lnot } \Diamond {(p \wedge \lnot q) \wedge } \Diamond {p \wedge } \Diamond {\lnot q}$$ ¬ ◊ ( p ∧ ¬ q ) ∧ ◊ p ∧ ◊ ¬ q . We explore the logical properties of this conditional in a reflexive normal Kripke semantics, provide an axiomatic system and prove it to be sound and complete for our semantics. The implicative conditional validates transitivity and contraposition, which we take to be integral parts of reasoning and communication. But it only validates restricted versions of strengthening the antecedent, right weakening, simplification, and rational monotonicity. Apparent counterexamples to some of these properties are explained as due to contextual factors. Finally, the implicative conditional avoids the paradoxes of material and strict implication, and validates some connexive principles such as Aristotle’s theses and weak Boethius’ thesis, as well as some highly entrenched principles of conditionals, such as conjunction of consequents, disjunction of antecedents, modus ponens, cautious monotonicity and cut.

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Evidential Support and Contraposition

Abstract: The concept of an evidential conditional If A then C that can be defined by the conjunction of $$A>C$$ A > C and $$\lnot C > \lnot A$$ ¬ C > ¬ A , where > is a conditional of the kind introduced by Stalnaker and Lewis, has recently been studied in a series of… Show more

Cited by 4 publications

References 26 publications

On the Logical Form of Evidential Conditionals

On the Logical Form of Evidential Conditionals

Conditionals: Inferentialism Explicated

The Implicative Conditional

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