Evolutionary dynamics of promoting electric vehicle-charging infrastructure based on public–private partnership cooperation

Yun, Lin; Lin, Yun; Lim, Ming K.; Zhou, Fuli; Ding, Rui; Zhang, Zusheng

doi:10.1016/j.energy.2021.122281

Cited by 52 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…The remaining sub-evolutionary path

corroborates that incentives are unsustainable in the long run. This finding has extended previous studies with evolutionary game [ 55 , 58 , 68 , 70 ].

is the other ESS where governments choose {NI} (No Incent); afterwards there is no motivation for manufactures, dealers and consumers to consider NEVs.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

“…However, recent studies focusing on a two-player or three-player game among governments, consumers and manufacturers [ 57 , 65 , 67 , 68 , 70 ] have limitations.…”

Section: Model and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to the literature [ 55 , 58 , 68 , 70 ] , the effect of the dual carbon policies on participants in the NEV market is non-linear in the long run. In other words, policy X produces effect Y in the short run, but in the long run, effect Y is time-varying.…”

Section: Model and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Huang et al explore incentive policies for hydrogen fuel cells and highight protectionism and divergent interests among different levels of governments and companies [ 67 ]. Through an evolutionary game considering governments, charging infrastructure operators, real estate agencies, and NEV users, the business model of NEV charging infrastructure investment and operations are evaluated [ 68 ]. Zhao, Ma and Wang use an evolutionary game to analyze the effect of government policies on motivating cold chain logistics firms to adopt NEVs [ 69 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dual Carbon Goal-Based Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game: Study on the New Energy Vehicle Industry in China

Liu

et al. 2023

IJERPH

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In an effort to tackle climate change, the “Dual Carbon” target raised by the Chinese government aims to reach peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Accordingly, policy incentives have accelerated the new energy vehicle (NEV) sector. Whilst previous studies have focused on the bilateral game between governments and manufacturers, NEV development has witnessed interaction among multiple players. In this paper, we construct a quadrilateral evolutionary game model, considering the impact of government policies, manufacturers’ R&D investments, dealers’ support, and consumer choice on the evolutionary stabilization strategy (ESS) in the context of China. The results show that: (1) in the absence of government incentives, there is no motivation for manufacturers, dealers and consumers to consider the development of NEVs; (2) government incentives affect manufacturers and consumers on the evolutionary paths in the short term. In the long term, benefit- and utility-based limited rationality has a dominant role in the ESS. This study contributes to the understanding of the multilateral dynamics of NEV innovation and provides important implications to practitioners and policy makers.

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“…The remaining sub-evolutionary path

corroborates that incentives are unsustainable in the long run. This finding has extended previous studies with evolutionary game [ 55 , 58 , 68 , 70 ].

is the other ESS where governments choose {NI} (No Incent); afterwards there is no motivation for manufactures, dealers and consumers to consider NEVs.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

“…However, recent studies focusing on a two-player or three-player game among governments, consumers and manufacturers [ 57 , 65 , 67 , 68 , 70 ] have limitations.…”

Section: Model and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Model and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Dual Carbon Goal-Based Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game: Study on the New Energy Vehicle Industry in China

Liu

et al. 2023

IJERPH

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“…The traditional government-led model of GRs has hindered the sustainable development process of traditional buildings in China. At present, the PPP model is widely applied in highways 36 , water conservancy projects 37 , new energy power infrastructure 8 , charging infrastructure 38 , 39 , smart cities 40 , public rental housing 41 , etc. It also provides ideas for accelerating the GR of TACs under the PPP model.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary analysis of resident groups’ intention to participate in green retrofit PPP projects of traditional apartment complexes

Yang

Sun

Wang

et al. 2023

Sci Rep

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Green retrofit PPP projects of traditional apartment complexes play an important role in promoting the green and low-carbon transformation of the construction industry and achieving China's "double carbon" goals. The integrated retrofit of apartment complexes presupposes that the resident groups agree to the retrofit. Therefore, it is necessary to study the evolutionary mechanism of residents' intention to green retrofit and the transformation process of their behavior, and to explore how to enhance residents' intention to participate. First, the dissemination model of residents' intention to green retrofit is constructed. Then, the strategic interaction among government, social capitals and residents under the PPP model is introduced into the dissemination model to define the state transformation probability of resident groups. Finally, the evolution laws of residents' intention to green retrofit are analyzed. The results show that: (1) the behavior of government regulation and social capitals' effort to retrofit can motivate the number of the resident agreeing to green retrofit to meet the proportional limit, (2) the faster the government chooses the strategy of regulation and the social capitals choose the strategy of effort to retrofit, the faster the number of residents agreeing to green retrofit reaches a steady state, (3) when the level of government publicity and education is too low, the cost of government regulation or the subsidy given to residents is too high, the green retrofit of traditional apartment complexes cannot be achieved. The research conclusions can provide a reference for the government to formulate green retrofit policies.

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Operation and Control of EV Infrastructure for Microgrid

Viswanathan,

Gunapriya,

Mathankumar

et al. 2024

Microgrids for Commercial Systems

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Evolutionary dynamics of promoting electric vehicle-charging infrastructure based on public–private partnership cooperation

Cited by 52 publications

References 45 publications

Dual Carbon Goal-Based Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game: Study on the New Energy Vehicle Industry in China

Dual Carbon Goal-Based Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game: Study on the New Energy Vehicle Industry in China

Evolutionary analysis of resident groups’ intention to participate in green retrofit PPP projects of traditional apartment complexes

Operation and Control of EV Infrastructure for Microgrid

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