Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholders’ Decision-Making Behaviors Based on Constraints of “Dual Carbon” Goal

Abstract

The government, enterprises, and consumers play an important role in the realization of the "dual carbon" goal. However, the relationship between consumer behavior and this goal has not received sufficient attention. Based on theories related to green consumption, this paper analyzes the internal psychological factors of consumers and external influencing factors and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, enterprises, and consumers. The findings are as follows: (1) If the consumer's price sensitivity coefficient is either too high or too low, it does not favor the evolution of consumer behavior towards green consumption, nor does it encourage enterprises to adopt green production practices. In such scenarios, government regulation and the provision of green subsidies to consumers and enterprises might be more effective. (2) The larger the green preference coefficient of consumers, the more likely they are to opt for green consumption, which in turn accelerates the shift of enterprises towards green production. In this situation, a robust supply and demand market for green products can effectively alleviate the pressure of environmental regulation. (3) The government's "dual carbon" policy publicity prompts consumers to choose green consumption and enterprises to choose green production. (4) Government subsidies to enterprises and to consumers both encourage enterprises to choose green production and consumers to choose green consumption. The results of this study provide enlightenment on the development of the green product market and the achievement of the "dual carbon" goal.