Evolutionary Game Analysis on Government Supervision and Dairy Enterprise in the Process of Product Recall in China

Abstract

On the basis of stating recall and regulation mode, this paper analyzes long-term evolutionary trend between dairy enterprise and government supervision on bounded rationality with evolutionary game. The authors use Python matplotlib to simulate research results. Studies show that it is helpful to build a standard recall system of defect and dairy products. This system should reduce the costs of government supervision. In addition, in case of mandatory recall, it should strengthen punishment intensity of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise, increase more losing costs of dairy enterprise, and decrease external environment benefits of dairy enterprise. In case of voluntary recall, the system should encourage various strategies and subsidy of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise and amplify social influence of dairy enterprise. Especially, the paper puts forward detailed strategies for dairy enterprise.

Media Sentiment, Government Supervision Strategy, and Stock Price Fluctuation Risk

“…(1) Government supervision strength ξ [19,[22][23][24] reflects the government's attention to relevant stock market events and the intensity of supervision. e stronger the government supervision strength ξ is, the more the attention the government attaches to the relevant stock market events is, and the higher the intensity of the supervision measures is.…”

“…e stronger the government supervision strength ξ is, the more the attention the government attaches to the relevant stock market events is, and the higher the intensity of the supervision measures is. (2) Government supervision persistence κ [17,19,22] reflects the persistence of government supervision of stock market events. e higher the government supervision persistence κ is, the stronger the continuity of government supervision of related stock market events.…”

“…erefore, it is necessary to further explore how different media sentiment factors and their interaction affect the contagion of stock price fluctuation risk from the perspective of communication science. e stock market is also very sensitive to the supervision strategy adopted by the government and thus shows different stock price fluctuation [17][18][19]. For example, Kuncoro et al [20] study how different supervision strategy affects the stability of the stock market and find that different government supervision strategy often leads to different stock price fluctuation and then affects the formation of stock price fluctuation risk.…”

Analyze Performance of Enterprise Supervision System by Game Theory-Take the case of Tatung Management Rights Competition as Example

“…Enterprise supervision system were used to effectively enhance the competitiveness of enterprises. In [13], author used evolutionary game to regulation mode for analyzing long-term evolutionary trend between dairy enterprise and government supervision. They applied Python matplotlib to simulate research results.…”

Knowledge Input or Not in the Dynamic Cooperation Behavior of Top Management Teams? From the Perspective of Knowledge Flow

“…In terms of the evolutionary choice of nature, Brown [42] considered that game theory not only could be applied to matrix games and social games, it also could be applied to speciation, macroevolution and perhaps even to cancer; Sample and Allen [43] studied the weak selection and large population size in the evolutionary game theory. In terms of social games, Feng et al [44] explored the behavioral motivation that leads drivers to illegally occupy the motorway emergency lane; Song and Zhang [45] explored the collaborative innovation processes between industry and university based on evolutionary games; moreover, some scholars also used the evolutionary game theory to explore the information sharing behavior [46], regional cooperative governance [47], government supervision [48], ect social behavior. In addition, from the perspective of evolutionary participants, scholars also have studied three-party and multi-party games.…”