Evolutionary game dynamics of the Wright-Fisher process with different selection intensities

Wang, Xianjia; Gu, Cuiling; Quan, Ji

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.01.006

Cited by 14 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Consequently, forecasting the enduring impacts of individual actions on resource stewardship has come to the forefront as a paramount challenge. Existing research has explored the complex relationship between resource environments and stakeholder behaviours, leading to the formulation of sophisticated models [47][48][49][50][51][52][53]. These models integrate diverse factors such as incentives [31], regulatory norms [54] and sociocultural influences [55], providing a comprehensive perspective on resource utilization dynamics.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics

Wang,

Liu,

Guo

et al. 2024

Proc. R. Soc. B.

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In contemporary society, the effective utilization of public resources remains a subject of significant concern. A common issue arises from defectors seeking to obtain an excessive share of these resources for personal gain, potentially leading to resource depletion. To mitigate this tragedy and ensure sustainable development of resources, implementing mechanisms to either reward those who adhere to distribution rules or penalize those who do not, appears advantageous. We introduce two models: a tax-reward model and a tax-punishment model, to address this issue. Our analysis reveals that in the tax-reward model, the evolutionary trajectory of the system is influenced not only by the tax revenue collected but also by the natural growth rate of the resources. Conversely, the tax-punishment model exhibits distinct characteristics when compared with the tax-reward model, notably the potential for bistability. In such scenarios, the selection of initial conditions is critical, as it can determine the system’s path. Furthermore, our study identifies instances where the system lacks stable points, exemplified by a limit cycle phenomenon, underscoring the complexity and dynamism inherent in managing public resources using these models.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics

Wang,

Liu,

Guo

et al. 2024

Proc. R. Soc. B.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Consequently, forecasting the enduring impacts of individual actions on resource stewardship has ascended to the forefront as a paramount challenge. Existing research has explored the complex relationship between resource environments and stakeholder behaviors, leading to the formulation of sophisticated models [48][49][50][51][52][53][54]. These models integrate diverse factors such as incentives [32], regulatory norms [55], and sociocultural influences [56], providing a comprehensive perspective on resource utilization dynamics.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Media Use and Privacy Concerns: How Do College Students View Internet Privacy and Information Protection?

Yangling¹,

Liu²

2023

Preprint

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“…In a word, the path integral approach provides a novel insight to study the evolutionary game. One could consider the evolutionary process with eco-evolutionary feedback [29][30][31], environment fluctuation [32][33][34], the varying selection intensity [35][36][37], mutation [38][39][40] and so on in this framework. And how these factors affect the evolutionary game could be explored in this formula in the future.…”

Section: -P4mentioning

confidence: 99%

The path integral formula for the stochastic evolutionary game dynamics

Liu

et al. 2023

EPL

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Although the long-term behavior of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations has been fully investigated, its evolutionary characteristics in a limited period of time is still unclear. In order to answer this question, we introduce the formulation of the path integral approach for evolutionary game theory. In this framework, the transition probability is the sum of all the evolutionary paths. The path integral formula of the transition probability maybe expected to be a new mathematical tool to explore the stochastic game evolutionary dynamics. As an example, we derive the transition probability for stochastic evolutionary game dynamics by the path integral in a limited period of time with updating rule of the Wright-Fisher process.

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Evolutionary game dynamics of the Wright-Fisher process with different selection intensities

Cited by 14 publications

References 32 publications

The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics

The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics

Social Media Use and Privacy Concerns: How Do College Students View Internet Privacy and Information Protection?

The path integral formula for the stochastic evolutionary game dynamics

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