Evolutionary Game Mechanism on Complex Networks of Green Agricultural Production under Intensive Management Pattern

Du, Jianguo; Zhou, Zhuoyun; Xu, Lingyan

doi:10.1155/2020/8541517

Cited by 13 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…In addition, the heavy metal spot level in farmland soil of major grain-producing areas in China has excessed to 21.5% [9]. Thus, agricultural non-point source pollution in China under the intensive management pattern has been characterized as cluster, explosion and crossover, for which the agricultural ecological environment has suffered serious damage [10,11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Zhou

2020

IJERPH

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This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control by stakeholders including local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between new agricultural operators and traditional farmers under the guidance of local governments, by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that new agricultural operators play a leading role in agricultural non-point source pollution control, whose strategies have effects such as technology spillover. The rewards from the superior government will support local governments in taking proactive action in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control, and then local governments can offer technical support and subsidies to new agricultural operators and traditional farmers for reducing their costs. Furthermore, this paper also finds that there are green synergy effects among the groups, where the variations of parameters and strategies by one group would affect the two others. Additionally, agricultural land operation rights transfers would cause traditional farmers to take more time to cooperate in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control. In order to promote the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to reduce their costs and improve incentives, as well as to increase the common interests among groups and enhance their green synergy effects.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Zhou

2020

IJERPH

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“…By establishing a dynamic penalty mechanism and increasing the penalty coefficient, the government would enhance the effect of environmental regulations and enable polluting enterprises to reduce emissions [20][21][22]. e government's increase in penalties on enterprises would increase the cost of violations of the law, and the increase in the cost of violations would lead to the reduction of waste gas emissions by enterprises, which in turn would enable the government to achieve effective long-term supervision [23,24]. Similarly, increasing the loss of the higher level government's inaction was an important guarantee for effective supervision [25,26].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Research between the Government Environmental Regulation Intensities and the Pollution Emissions of Papermaking Enterprises

Zhang

Qin

Ling

et al. 2021

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Environmental regulations of different intensities may have different impacts on polluting enterprises. The purpose of this article is to analyze how different environmental regulations affect the pollution discharge strategies of papermaking enterprises. By establishing an evolutionary game model between the government environmental regulation intensities and the pollutant emissions from papermaking enterprises, this thesis further solves the model and performs stability analysis and finally uses MATLAB to conduct simulation studies. And the researching results show that papermaking enterprises will take risks to choose the illegal pollutant discharge strategies when the illegal profits are large. Further analysis shows that the increase in the successful probability of the strong environmental regulations does not necessarily force papermaking enterprises to choose to comply with pollution discharge regulations. However, papermaking enterprises may choose to comply with discharge pollution regulations not only by increasing the successful probability of strong environmental regulations but also by increasing the rewards and punishments for papermaking enterprises as well as by increasing the probability of reporting violations of pollutants. Based on the above results, the author proposes several countermeasures, such as establishing a specialized pollution monitoring agency, encouraging third-party supervision, reporting pollution behaviors, and increasing penalties for polluting companies for violations. China is in a critical period of transition from rapid development to high-quality development. It will provide some reliable references for the construction of a green economy and an ecological economy that the characteristics and relationships between the intensity of government environmental regulations and corporate pollution emissions revealed in this article.

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“…Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical model that combines evolutionary biology and game theory to study the formation of stable strategies or equilibrium states of rational or bounded rational individuals in repeated games with adaptive and learning capabilities. The evolutionary game method is widely used in the feasibility study of energy utilization, policy governance, commercial projects, management models, and other fields [40][41][42][43].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Analysis and Simulation of the Feasibility and Stability of Innovative Carbon Emission Reduction Projects Entering the Carbon-Trading Market

et al. 2023

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Designing green agricultural production projects as CER projects is attractive, as it can play a role in promoting the spread of green production technologies and reducing carbon emissions based on market-based compensation. This research constructed a generic analytical framework using evolutionary game methods to evaluate the feasibility and stability of innovative CER projects by numerical analysis or simulation. Finally, two complex scenarios were analysed using simulations based on the framework. The simulation analysis results show that when the profits of VER and CER projects are close, the government’s direct intervention will lead to instability in market development, and the development of VER projects should be focused on. Government subsidies to promote the agricultural sector to participate in CER construction can be gradually reduced with the development of the market. When the reduction speed is slow enough, the effectiveness of subsidies will not be affected. The framework will be helpful to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of CER mechanism innovation and development, and to formulate more targeted policies to promote the popularization of green agricultural production technologies.

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Evolutionary Game Mechanism on Complex Networks of Green Agricultural Production under Intensive Management Pattern

Cited by 13 publications

References 26 publications

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Evolutionary Game Research between the Government Environmental Regulation Intensities and the Pollution Emissions of Papermaking Enterprises

Dynamic Analysis and Simulation of the Feasibility and Stability of Innovative Carbon Emission Reduction Projects Entering the Carbon-Trading Market

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