Examining supply chain financing: A comparative and coordination analysis under a buyback contract

Abstract

This paper focuses on financing schemes for a supply chain with high salvage values of unsold products. Combining the buyback contract with a partial credit guarantee (PCG) contract and trade credit (TC) contract, we propose two financing schemes, PCG-Buyback and TC-Buyback, to provide flexible financing services for a capital-constrained retailer and obtain equilibrium strategies of each supply chain member. Furthermore, for PCGBuyback, this paper obtains a Pareto coordination frontier consisting of the credit guarantee coefficient and the buyback price at different initial capital levels, which is more flexible to achieve supply chain coordination. Finally, we analyze the manufacturer’s strategic choices of PCG-Buyback and TC-Buyback in terms of credit guarantee coefficient, buyback price, and financing rate. Our results show that PCG-Buyback is the optimal financing scheme for the manufacturer when both the credit guarantee coefficient and buyback price (or financing rate) are low; otherwise, TC-Buyback is the dominant strategy. This study explores how the risk-sharing mechanism combination of PCG and buyback contracts can provide a more flexible approach to supply chain coordination. Additionally, it highlights the significance of the manufacturer selecting a better financing scheme based on its individual characteristics.