Exclusion and Power: A Test of Four Theories of Power in Exchange Networks

Skvoretz, John; Willer, David

doi:10.2307/2095952

Cited by 176 publications

(94 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…3 Emerson's reorientation of exchange theory toward networks of relations rather than isolated dyads stimulated a vast and impressive corpus of theory and research. That research shows in detail how exchange networks affect the distribution of rewards across individuals in different positions (Molm and Cook 1995) and also how actors' choice of partner among a set of exchange opportunities generates some exchange relations and not others (e.g., Cook et al 1983;Markovsky et al 1988;Skvoretz and Willer 1993;Friedkin 1992).…”

Section: Under Certain Conditions Thereby Producing Stronger or Weakmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…My affect theory helps explain such emerging relationships, by adding an emotional dimension and suggesting how relations can take on intrinsic or expressive value. Skvoretz and Willer 1993;Willer et al 1997). 3 Emerson's reorientation of exchange theory toward networks of relations rather than isolated dyads stimulated a vast and impressive corpus of theory and research.…”

Section: Under Certain Conditions Thereby Producing Stronger or Weakmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Affect Theory of Social Exchange

Lawler

2001

American Journal of Sociology

951

1,016

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This article develops a theory that explains how and when emotions, produced by social exchange, generate stronger or weaker ties to relations, groups, or networks. It is argued that social exchange produces positive or negative global feelings, which are internally rewarding or punishing. The theory indicates that social units (relations, groups, networks) are perceived as a source of these feelings, contingent on the degree of jointness in the exchange task. The jointness of the task is greatest if (1) actors find it difficult to distinguish their individual effects on or contributions to solving the exchange task (nonseparability) and (2) actors perceive a shared responsibility for success or failure at the exchange task. The theory explicates the effects of different exchange structures on these conditions and, in turn, on cohesion and solidarity. Implications are developed for network-to-group transformations. This article develops a theory that explains how and when emotions, produced by social exchange, generate stronger or weaker ties to relations, groups, or networks. It is argued that social exchange produces positive or negative global feelings, which are internally rewarding or punishing. The theory indicates that social units (relations, groups, networks) are perceived as a source of these feelings, contingent on the degree of jointness in the exchange task. The jointness of the task is greatest if (1) actors find it difficult to distinguish their individual effects on or contributions to solving the exchange task (nonseparability) and (2) actors perceive a shared responsibility for success or failure at the exchange task. The theory explicates the effects of different exchange structures on these conditions and, in turn, on cohesion and solidarity. Implications are developed for network-to-group transformations.This article proposes an affect theory of social exchange. The purpose is to incorporate emotions as an explicit, central feature of social exchange processes. The article accomplishes this by (1) conceptualizing individual actors as emoting as well as cognizing, feeling as well as thinking, (2) treating emotions as internal reinforcements or punishments, and (3) Social exchange is conceptualized as a joint activity of two or more actors in which each actor has something the other values. The implicit or explicit task in exchange is to generate benefit for each individual by exchanging behaviors or goods that actors cannot achieve alone (Thibaut and Kelley 1959;Homans 1961;Emerson 1972b). The affect theory of social exchange expands the domain of exchange theorizing in two main ways. First, exchange outcomes-rewards and punishments-are construed as having emotional effects that vary in form and intensity. When exchanges occur successfully, actors experience an emotional uplift (a "high"), and when exchanges do not occur successfully, they experience emotional "downs" (Lawler and Yoon 1996). Mild everyday feelings, therefore, are intertwined with exchange. Positive emotions include e...

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Section: Under Certain Conditions Thereby Producing Stronger or Weakmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Under Certain Conditions Thereby Producing Stronger or Weakmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Affect Theory of Social Exchange

Lawler

2001

American Journal of Sociology

951

1,016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…There are various experimental results with regard to profit and power distributions in simple exchange networks (e.g., Bienenstock and Bonacich, 1993;Lovaglia et al, 1995;Skvoretz and Fararo, 1992;Skvoretz and Willer, 1993;Yamagishi et al, 1988). Since many experiments have been conducted, several exchange theorists (e.g., Burke, 1997;Friedkin, 1995;Yamaguchi, 1996) substantiate the empirical relevance of new theoretical ideas by referring to an appropriate subset of the published findings.…”

Section: Experiments and Data Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Nash bargaining model for simple exchange networks

Braun

Gautschi

2006

Social Networks

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Starting from exogenously given negotiation networks, sociological exchange theories explain bilateral divisions of fixed surpluses (e.g., cake, dollar) as consequences of the partners' structural embeddedness. In accordance with the available experimental evidence, we focus on simple exchange networks and present a formal model for predicting profit splits from such structures. In contrast to other approaches, we combine the generalized Nash bargaining solution from game theory with the assumption that both relational features and network positions affect exchange outcomes

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“…In many spheres (eg, political sociology, social psychology, international relations), the concept of power is typically thought of as the ability to influence others, or get someone to do something they would not otherwise do. [15][16][17][18][19] While there are many other interpretations of the meaning of power, it was left undefined during the interviews and so the scope of this paper does not allow for a full examination of these alternative theories. As such, 'power as influence' will be taken as the operational definition of power for the purposes of this study, since this is the most common and likely how respondents conceptualized it during the interviews.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Power and Agenda-Setting in Tanzanian Health Policy: An Analysis of Stakeholder Perspectives

Fischer

Strandberg-Larsen

2016

Int J Health Policy Manag

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Background: Global health policy is created largely through a collaborative process between development agencies and aid-recipient governments, yet it remains unclear whether governments retain ownership over the creation of policy in their own countries. An assessment of the power structure in this relationship and its influence over agenda-setting is thus the first step towards understanding where progress is still needed in policymaking for development. Methods: This study employed qualitative policy analysis methodology to examine how health-related policy agendas are adopted in low-income countries, using Tanzania as a case study. Semi-structured, in-depth, key informant interviews with 11 policy-makers were conducted on perspectives of the agenda-setting process and its actors. Kingdon's stream theory was chosen as the lens through which to interpret the data analysis. Results: This study demonstrates that while stakeholders each have ways of influencing the process, the power to do so can be assessed based on three major factors: financial incentives, technical expertise, and influential position. Since donors often have two or all of these elements simultaneously a natural power imbalance ensues, whereby donor interests tend to prevail over recipient government limitations in prioritization of agendas. One way to mediate these imbalances seems to be the initiation of meaningful policy dialogue. Conclusion: In Tanzania, the agenda-setting process operates within a complex network of factors that interact until a "policy window" opens and a decision is made. Power in this process often lies not with the Tanzanian government but with the donors, and the contrast between latent presence and deliberate use of this power seems to be based on the donor ideology behind giving aid (defined here by funding modality). Donors who used pooled funding (PF) modalities were less likely to exploit their inherent power, whereas those who preferred to maintain maximum control over the aid they provided (ie, non-pooled funders) more readily wielded their intrinsic power to push their own priorities. Keywords: Health Policy, Policy Analysis, Agenda-Setting, Power, Tanzania Copyright: © 2016 by Kerman University of Medical Sciences Citation: Fischer SE, Strandberg-Larsen M. Power and agenda-setting in Tanzanian health policy: an analysis of stakeholder perspectives.

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Exclusion and Power: A Test of Four Theories of Power in Exchange Networks

Cited by 176 publications

References 22 publications

An Affect Theory of Social Exchange

An Affect Theory of Social Exchange

A Nash bargaining model for simple exchange networks

Power and Agenda-Setting in Tanzanian Health Policy: An Analysis of Stakeholder Perspectives

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