Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Last revised April, 1997 Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe investigate the determinants of executive pay in a sample of Italian firms. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study on the compensation of Italian executives. We estimate that an increase of real profits per firm by 1 billion lire increases the pay of top executives by only 504 thousand lire, more than the increase found for middle management (184 thousand). Pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in firms where profits are declining and profit variability is relatively low. This sensitivity is lower in domestic-owned firms and in firms that are not affiliated to a multinational group, a result consistent with the main features of Italian capitalism.JEL codes: D82, J33.

Past Performance and Executive Compensation: Evidence from Indonesia

“…It is in line with the findings of some previous studies on pay-for-performance hypothesis (e.g. Core et al, 1999;Geringer et al, 1999;Brunello et al, 2001;Kato et al, 2007;Bangoj et al, 2010, Shaw & Zhang, 2010Ozkan, 2011).…”

“…A number of studies have been attempting to examine the pay-for-performance hypothesis (Core et al, 1999;Geringer et al, 1999;Brunello et al, 2001;Kato et al, 2007;Bangoj et al, 2010, Shaw & Zhang, 2010Ozkan, 2011). Mostly, those studies find evidences on pay-for-performance hypothesis.…”

Remuneração Variável: Um Estudo da Relação com Indicadores Financeiros das Companhias Abertas Brasileiras

“…Ademais, o estabelecimento de contratos de remuneração baseados no desempenho do gestor tem o objetivo de servir como um mecanismo de alinhamento de interesses entre gestores e proprietários (Ittner, Larcker & Rajan, 1997;Reichelstein, 2000;Beuren, Silva & Mazzioni, 2014 (Murphy, 1985(Murphy, , 1999Abowd, 1990;Leonard, 1990), Reino Unido (Conyon, Gregg & Machin, 1995;Ozkan, 2011), Itália (Brunello, Graziano & Parigi, 2001) e Japão (Kato & Rockel, 1992;Kato & Kubo, 2006).…”

CEO compensation and bank efficiency: An application of conditional nonparametric frontiers

“…Brunello et al (2001), who use a sample of 107 Italian firms, point out the positive relationship between CEO compensation and firms' profit levels. Mitsudome et al (2008) compare Japanese and US companies and their results indicate that there is a significantly positive relationship between CEO compensation and short-term performance.…”