2019
DOI: 10.1007/s11750-019-00516-2
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Existence of Nash equilibria in stochastic games of resource extraction with risk-sensitive players

Abstract: We consider a two-person stochastic game of resource extraction. It is assumed that players have identical preferences. A novelty relies on the fact that each player is equipped with the same risk coefficient and calculates his discounted utility in the infinite time horizon in a recursive way by applying the entropic risk measure parametrized by this risk coefficient. Under two alternative sets of assumptions, we prove the existence of a symmetric stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.Mathematics Subject Clas… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…In such a game, and for any given set of strategies, one for each player, the state for which the players obtain the highest possible utility (i.e. minimum possible travel time) is called the Nash equilibrium [23]. The Wardrop equilibrium qualifies further in that the high possible utility must have been achieved through distribution of traffic [24].…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In such a game, and for any given set of strategies, one for each player, the state for which the players obtain the highest possible utility (i.e. minimum possible travel time) is called the Nash equilibrium [23]. The Wardrop equilibrium qualifies further in that the high possible utility must have been achieved through distribution of traffic [24].…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The condition that the players have the same preferences makes a game symmetric. For the results on a stationary Nash equilibrium existence in the symmetric setup of resource extraction games the reader is referred to [6][7][8][9][10]. Studies [11,12] tackled the problem in the non-symmetric case while assuming that the preferences of the players are bounded.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rubinstein [3] investigated that bounded rational participants continuously modified their cognition in repeated games in which compared current strategies with previous ones to make optimal strategy choices. Asienkiewicz and Balbus [4] presented the existence analysis of NE for random games under certain conditions. Watkins [5,6] first proposed the Q-learning method, and proved the convergence of Q-learning.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%