Experimental evidence on the resilience of a cap &amp; trade system for land consumption in Germany

Meub, Lukas; Proeger, Till; Bizer, Kilian; Henger, Ralph

doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.10.018

Cited by 13 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…As previous studies have emphasized (Meub et al, 2014(Meub et al, , 2016Proeger et al, 2015), average market prices tend to exceed unit auction prices, which might be explained by the endowment effect (Kahneman et al, 1991).…”

Section: Results 1a: Independent Of Chat Communication Among Agents Pmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…Proeger et al (2015) have considered the effects of sustained high investment risk, finding that TDR schemes lose efficiency when confronted with higher levels of risk. Finally, Meub et al (2016) investigate the resilience of a TDR scheme to exogenous economic shocks, finding that the system compensates shocks fairly well.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…by Meub et al (2016). All experimental subjects are matched to markets of six players, which remain constant throughout the fifteen periods of the game.…”

Section: An Outline Of the Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

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The Role of Communication on an Experimental Market for Tradable Development Rights

2016

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. scheme and investigate the effects of communication, an aspect typically assumed to be irrelevant by theory. We consider communication among individual participants competing in a TDR system and team decision-making facilitated by face-to-face communication. We find the system to be quite efficient, despite overshooting certificate prices particularly in the beginning for both initial issuance in auctions and the secondary market. Communication significantly reduces auction prices, leading to substantially less income redistribution from participants to the auctioneer. This effect is explained by participants' improved understanding of the cap & trade system when communicating; despite participants' attempts, they fail to establish collusion. Team decision-making is not only shown to reduce overshooting prices; moreover, it also improves the system's efficiency. These results are interpreted as emphasizing the efficiency and political feasibility of TDR schemes when including communication among its participants. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Results 1a: Independent Of Chat Communication Among Agents Pmentioning

confidence: 85%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Role of Communication on an Experimental Market for Tradable Development Rights

2016

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“…For instance, Henger (2013) compares the performance of student participants and municipal planners, finding that both groups achieve a fairly efficient allocation of certificates. Moreover, Meub et al (2014) consider the influence of political business cycles within a TDR system, while Meub et al (2015) investigate the efficiency of different mechanisms for allocating development rights and Meub et al (2016) show the impact of macroeconomic shocks on a system of TDR.…”

Section: Tdr and Laboratory Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note that the general experimental design uses the framework introduced by Meub et al (2016). In the game, groups ("markets") of six participants are matched to interact for 15 periods.…”

Section: Overview Of the Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Tradable development rights under uncertainty: an experimental approach

Proeger

Meub

Bizer

2018

Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: Tradable development rights (TDR) are discussed as a mechanism to reduce land consumption while ensuring an efficient implementation of profitable building projects. We present a novel laboratory experiment on the feasibility of TDR and simulate the acquisition and trading of development rights. In particular, we investigate the effects of uncertainty in the revenues of land consumption projects. Overall, we find that TDR are reallocated as suggested by theory, although higher uncertainty has substantial detrimental effects on the distribution of land consumption projects and thus aggregate welfare. This enables us to formulate distinct policy implications for the design of TDR systems. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Quantitative Targets, Tradable Planning Permits and Infrastructure Cost Calculators: Examples of Instruments Addressing Land Take in Europe

Bovet

Marquard

2022

International Yearbook of Soil Law and Policy

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Experimental evidence on the resilience of a cap & trade system for land consumption in Germany

Cited by 13 publications

References 21 publications

The Role of Communication on an Experimental Market for Tradable Development Rights

The Role of Communication on an Experimental Market for Tradable Development Rights

Tradable development rights under uncertainty: an experimental approach

Quantitative Targets, Tradable Planning Permits and Infrastructure Cost Calculators: Examples of Instruments Addressing Land Take in Europe

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