Explaining the Perseverance of "Independence in Europe": Strategic Reinforcements of Minority Nationalist Pro-Europeanism

Abstract

In the 1980's minority nationalist parties adopted a policy of "independence in Europe." Paradoxically, the policy simultaneously advocated conceding powers to a supranational body and taking back powers from the state. EU regional development programs initially spurred these pro-European policies, but these programs have since failed. Given the EU incentives, why do minority nationalist parties remain pro-European? I test a bottom-up, party political theory and use the British case studies of the Scottish National Party and the Welsh nationalist party, Plaid Cymru. I argue that these parties have remained proEuropean because they are small oppositional parties. As small oppositional parties, minority nationalist parties have unique strategic mechanisms that incentivize policy inertia. These mechanisms are: (1) the continuity and dominance of party leadership in making EU policy, (2) underdeveloped policy positions, and (3) the importance of transnational coalitions. Implications include the possibility that as minority nationalist parties grow in size and power, they might alter their European position to suit changing strategic considerations. KeywordsNationalism, Pro-European, Scotland, WalesExplaining the Perseverance of "Independence in Europe": StrategiIntroduction "Scotland's Future-Independence in Europe" dominates the front page of a 1990 Scottish National Party pamphlet. After decades of anti-European rhetoric, the Scottish National Party voted at a party conference in 1983 to support the European Community and the new slogan placed the pro-European policy at the center of SNP ideology. Today, the SNP's pro-European position remains unchanged. Deputy leader Nicola Sturgeon pledged Scotland would be a "proud and constructive partner in the European family" upon independence (Johnson, 2013). Since the 1980's, sustained pro-Europeanism has been a pattern in minority nationalist 1 parties across Europe. At the time that pro-European policies developed, the Europe of the Regions model created a hospitable environment for minority nationalists by valuing the input of sub-state regions and local authorities. Minority nationalist parties enjoyed the "pincer effect" as they squeezed state power locally and at the EU level (Lynch, 1996, p. 14). The 1980's were also relatively hospitable for the European Union among mainstream parties. However, domestic and EU contexts have changed dramatically. Both mainstream Europhilia and the Europe of the Regions have faded over the past 30 years. Most positions in the Council of Ministers and European Commission are still dominated by parties in government and exclude regional powers (Elias, 2008). A "growing discrepancy between 'regional' priorities" hindered regional lobbying at the European Union (Rowe, 2011, p. 8). In conjunction with lack of regional unity, "national governments proved themselves to be highly adept at acting as 'gatekeepers'" (Elias, 2008, p. 486).2 Domestically, "increased Euroscepticism has been the corollary of increased integration" (Taggar...