Exploring the Links between Party and Appointment: Canadian Federal Judicial Appointments from 1989 to 2003

Abstract

Abstract. Studies of federal judicial appointments made before 1988 discovered significant partisan ties between judicial appointees and the governments appointing them. In 1988, in response to criticism of these “patronage appointments,” the Mulroney government introduced screening committees to the process. This article explores the impact of these committees. Using information gained from surveys of legal elites, we trace the minor and major political connections of federal judicial appointees from 1989 to 2003 in order to determine whether patronage has continued despite the reform to the process. We discover that political connections continued to play an important role in who was selected for a judicial appointment. However, these connections were not quite as common as those found before 1988, and the new process does appear to have prevented the politically motivated appointment of completely unqualified candidates. Interestingly, our findings also suggest that the impact of patronage varies by region and interacts with other, newer influences, in particular, concerns for group representation on the bench. The paper concludes by briefly discussing these results in the context of the relationship between judicial selection and politics with a comparative perspective.Résumé. Les études sur les nominations judiciaires fédérales réalisées avant 1988 ont découvert des liens partisans étroits entre les juges nommés à la cour et les gouvernements les nommant. En 1988, en réponse aux critiques sur le favoritisme entourant les nominations, le gouvernement Mulroney a introduit des comités d'évaluation dans le processus. Cet article explore l'impact de ces comités. En utilisant de l'information recueillie lors de sondages menés auprès de la communauté légale, nous retraçons les connexions politiques mineures et majeures des attributaires judiciaires fédéraux de 1989 à 2003 en vue de déterminer si le favoritisme a persisté malgré la réforme du système. Nous découvrons que les connexions politiques continuent à jouer un rôle important dans la sélection des juges. Toutefois, ces connexions ne sont pas aussi importantes que celles qu'on a identifiées avant 1988 et le nouveau processus semble avoir réussi à prévenir les nominations partisanes de candidats entièrement non qualifiés. Les résultats de notre recherche suggèrent également que l'effet du favoritisme varie par région et dépend aussi d'autres facteurs plus nouveaux, en particulier le souci de représentation de certains groupes au sein de la magistrature. L'article conclut en discutant brièvement ces résultats dans le contexte de la relation entre la sélection judiciaire et la politique dans une perspective comparative.

Does Patronage Matter? Connecting Influences on Judicial Appointments with Judicial Decision Making

“…with the governing party. The trends were relatively consistent between Conservative and Liberal governments~see Hausegger et al, 2010, for a detailed description of all these data!.…”

“…The majority of candidates are promoted from a lower court and do not go through the committee process at this stage. However, the minister typically undertakes consultations with the legal community before promoting someone~for a more detailed description of the appointment process, see Hausegger et al, 2010!. Our earlier research on federal judicial appointments following the introduction of the screening committees shows that for the 1989 to 2003 time period 27 per cent of provincial appeal court appointees had "major" participation with the governing party that appointed them~such as campaign organizing or close social ties to a cabinet minister!, and 15 per cent had more "minor" activities and associations~political donations, minor constituency work! with the governing party.…”

The Politics of Judicial Appointment: Do Party Connections Impede the Appointment of Women to Canada's Federally Appointed Courts?

“…Looking at appointments by province helps to further unpack how party connection may adversely affect the likelihood that women will be appointed to the bench. Previous research has found that the number of judges with political connections varies dramatically by province (Hausegger et al, 2010; Russell and Ziegel, 1991). For example, whereas about 14 per cent of British Columbia's appointees had connections to the party in power between 1989 and 2003, this number was an astounding 90 per cent for Prince Edward Island (Hausegger et al, 2010: 643–646).…”

“…Relying exclusively on financial contributions means that other types of more substantive political involvement, such as being a party member, fundraising or running for political office, are excluded. Indeed, Hausegger and colleagues found that between 1989 and 2003 approximately 22 per cent of federal judicial appointees had major connections and/or major activities with the party in power (Hausegger et al, 2010: 647). Further, this article does not try to disentangle the different reasons why party connections may play an important role for judicial appointments, such as signaling a complementary political ideology, personal or professional connections, or as repayment for past political service.…”

“…The influence of party connection on the selection of judges has long been a reality in Canada (Russell, 1987). While the appointment of blatantly underqualified party loyalists is no longer a concern in the way it was a few decades ago (Russell and Ziegel, 1991), recent scholarship has shown that party connection remains a prominent feature among the women and men chosen by the federal government to serve as judges (Forcese and Freeman, 2005; Hausegger et al, 2010; Riddell et al, 2008). Participation in a political party is not necessarily a negative attribute for a judicial candidate to possess.…”