Export Controls and the Tensions Between Academic Freedom and National Security

Evans, Sam Weiss; Valdivia, Walter D.

doi:10.1007/s11024-012-9196-4

Cited by 27 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…This thwarting of public values can happen in federal laboratories as well. For example, if technology transfer activities undermine national security then there has been a supplanting of public values (Mowery, 1988;Aronowitz, 1999;Jaffe and Lerner, 2001;Kassicieh et al, 2002;Evans and Valdivia, 2012). Likewise, if the private entrepreneurship enabled under the Stevenson-Wydler Act (U.S. Congress, 1980Congress, , 1984aCongress, ,b, 1986 were to diminish the core research capabilities of federal laboratories' corporate research mission, here, too, would be a thwarting of public values (see Coursey and Bozeman, 1992;Butler and Birley, 1998).…”

Section: Public Value Criterion For Technology Transfer Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolving state-of-the-art in technology transfer research: Revisiting the contingent effectiveness model

2015

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Section: Public Value Criterion For Technology Transfer Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolving state-of-the-art in technology transfer research: Revisiting the contingent effectiveness model

2015

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“…If accidental gene drive releases were to occur and have severely deleterious effects, they might, for example, lead to much broader restructuring of concepts like academic freedom, the social contract for science, and the product versus process divide in different national regulatory systems, changes already long overdue (Evans and Valdivia 2012;Esvelt 2017b). …”

Section: Strategies That Accept Gene Drives As Anomalous But Not Adeqmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anomaly handling and the politics of gene drives

Evans

Palmer

2017

Journal of Responsible Innovation

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Decisions about the development and use of gene drives are framing broader debates about the need for fundamental changes to biotechnology regulatory systems. We summarize this debate and describe how gene drives are being constructed as potential anomalies within the regulatory landscape. Drawing on literature from Science and Technology Studies and other fields, we outline a broad set of anomaly-handling strategies and provide examples from current gene drive debates. While often couched in technical terms, decisions about how to address anomalies are also decisions about whether to strengthen or weaken different forms of governance. By exploring the different ways that anomalies are constructed and handled, we highlight the active role that anomalies play within a changing governance system and invite a more nuanced examination of the multifarious goals these strategies serve.ARTICLE HISTORY

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“…That said, many argue that the FRE is far too lax to deal with the current threats to the US, which call for tighter restrictions on knowledge circulation in academia. Three features of the current research system aggravate the dangers (Evans and Valdivia 2012).…”

Section: The Fundamental Research Exclusion (Fre) and Its Criticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Deemed exports are a particular mode of control under the EAR (Evans and Valdivia 2012;Krige 2014;Reppy and Felbinger 2011). The regulations here invoke concepts that stretch the meaning of "technology" and "export" in non-intuitive ways.…”

Section: Regulating Knowledge Flows: Deemed Exportsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Regulating the Academic “Marketplace of Ideas”: Commercialization, Export Controls, and Counterintelligence

Krige

2015

Engaging STS

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Two revolutions, not one, are transforming the research enterprise in American academia. One is the commercialization of research. The other is the regulation of research by the national security state that was accelerated by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and focuses increasingly on the risk of sensitive knowledge leaking to China and other countries of concern.Commercialization temporarily restricts knowledge circulation to secure a patent for personal and institutional gain. Regulation controls the flow of knowledge to select foreign nationals using multiple instruments, including export controls, along with informal surveillance by the FBI. Ironically, the neoliberal urge to roll back the state and commercialize research in a competitive global knowledge economy exposes the American academic research system to the risk of "industrial" espionage and rolls out the regulatory apparatus of the national security state. Alongside offices of technology transfer on campus we now have offices of export control and compliance. Faculty and graduate students have accommodated themselves to this new situation, even while they regret it; many are concerned by the challenge that it poses to academic freedom, intellectual dynamism and political openness.

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Export Controls and the Tensions Between Academic Freedom and National Security

Cited by 27 publications

References 22 publications

The evolving state-of-the-art in technology transfer research: Revisiting the contingent effectiveness model

The evolving state-of-the-art in technology transfer research: Revisiting the contingent effectiveness model

Anomaly handling and the politics of gene drives

Regulating the Academic “Marketplace of Ideas”: Commercialization, Export Controls, and Counterintelligence

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