Felt Reality and the Opacity of Perception

Abstract

We investigate the nature of the sense of presence that usually accompanies perceptual experience. We show that the notion of a sense of presence can be interpreted in two ways, corresponding to the sense that we are acquainted with an object, and the sense that the object is real. In this essay, we focus on the sense of reality. Drawing on several case studies such as derealization disorder, Parkinson's disease and virtual reality, we argue that the sense of reality is two-way independent from the spatial and sensory contents of experience. We suggest that the sense of reality is an affective experience akin to a metacognitive feeling. Finally, we present a potentially important implication of our account for the current debate between Intentionalism and Naïve Realism. Since perception is ''opaque'' with respect to the reality of what is perceived, Intentionalism cannot refer to the sense of reality as what differentiates perception from sensory-like experiences such as imaginings. In contrast, Naïve Realism has an independent explanation of the specificity of perception.

What makes a mental state feel like a memory: feelings of pastness and presence

“…Perception is often said to be accompanied by a 'feeling of presence', that objects and events are experienced as occurring here and now (Dokic & Martin, 2017;Matthen, 2005;Windt, 2018). As Dokic & Martin (2017) point out, it's been noted at least since Husserl that perceptual experience strikes us, introspectively, as if we are experiencing the present environment around us.…”

“…Perception is often said to be accompanied by a 'feeling of presence', that objects and events are experienced as occurring here and now (Dokic & Martin, 2017;Matthen, 2005;Windt, 2018). As Dokic & Martin (2017) point out, it's been noted at least since Husserl that perceptual experience strikes us, introspectively, as if we are experiencing the present environment around us. We argue that this sense, and the sense of pastness, are not in fact too mysterious to be useful (Byrne, 2010;Debus, 2016): they are helpful for distinguishing mental states from the first-person perspective.…”

“…As you episodically recall a past-perceived event, it feels as if what you are experiencing happened in the past, while imaging and perceiving lack this feeling (see also Matthen, 2010;Perrin et al, 2020;Tulving, 1985). In contrast, what you perceive, but not what you imagine or remember, feels both temporally and spatially present (Dokic & Martin, 2017;Matthen, 2005;Windt, 2018). We argue that this picture is not entirely correct; however, the sense of pastness describes an essential aspect of human cognition regarding what it's like to experience memory.…”

Developing a dynamic model of anomalous experiences and function in young people with or without psychosis: a cross-sectional and longitudinal study protocol

“…Limited research has assessed the association between anomalous self-experiences and metacognition, but it may be suggested metacognitive efficiency may also be associated with anomalous self-experiences, previously alluded to by Dokic and Martin. 38 This study will empirically test the association between anomalous self-experiences and perceptual biases and metacognition. Anomalous self-experiences and anomalous delusional beliefs have not been considered to be modality-specific; therefore, these measures are hypothesised to be related to both visual and auditory perceptual signal detection biases and metacognitive ability.…”

Naïve Realism and the Conception of Hallucination as Non-Sensory Phenomena

“…Dokic and Martin (2017) discuss how FoR is integrated in veridical experiences in detail.25 Even if the metacognitive view can successfully explain cognitive features of hallucination, it may face something like the higher order screening off problem. This is because if cognitive features of hallucination are fully explained in…”