Financial Intermediation and Deposit Contracts: A Strategic View

Larocca, Vittorio

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2598112

SSRN Journal

2015

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2598112

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Financial Intermediation and Deposit Contracts: A Strategic View

Vittorio Larocca

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications

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Use Rights for Common Pool Resources and Economic Development

2015

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: This paper explores the long-run development of an economy with a traditional sector based on common-pool resource-use, a modern, resource-independent sector with fixed entry costs, and an imperfect capital market. We show theoretically that introducing resource-use regulations increases incomes in the traditional sector and that this can trigger a development process with labor reallocation to the modern sector. Allowing trade of resource-use rights, or distributing resource-use rights unequally, broadens the scope for development. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Use Rights for Common Pool Resources and Economic Development

2015

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Household Heterogeneity, Aggregation, and the Distributional Impacts of Environmental Taxes

Giacomo

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper examines how the general equilibrium incidence of an environmental tax depends on the effect of different incomes and preferences of heterogeneous households on aggregate outcomes. We develop a Harberger-type model with general forms of preferences and substitution between capital, labor, and pollution in production that captures the impact of household heterogeneity and interactions with production characteristics on the general equilibrium. We theoretically show that failing to incorporate household heterogeneity can qualitatively affect incidence. We quantitatively illustrate that this aggregation bias can be important for assessing the incidence of a carbon tax, mainly by affecting the returns to factors of production. Our findings are robust to a number of extensions including alternative revenue recycling schemes, preexisting taxes, non-separable utility in pollution, labor-leisure choice, and multiple commodities. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Combining Price and Quantity Controls Under Partitioned Environmental Regulation

Abrell

2016

SSRN Journal

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Change combines cutting-edge scientific research with independent policy analysis to provide a solid foundation for the public and private decisions needed to mitigate and adapt to unavoidable global environmental changes. Being data-driven, the Joint Program uses extensive Earth system and economic data and models to produce quantitative analysis and predictions of the risks of climate change and the challenges of limiting human influence on the environmentessential knowledge for the international dialogue toward a global response to climate change.To this end, the Joint Program brings together an interdisciplinary group from two established MIT research centers: the Center for Global Change Science (CGCS) and the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR). These two centers-along with collaborators from the Marine Biology Laboratory (MBL) at Woods Hole and short-and long-term visitors-provide the united vision needed to solve global challenges.At the heart of much of the program's work lies MIT's Integrated Global System Model. Through this integrated model, the program seeks to discover new interactions among natural and human climate system components; objectively assess uncertainty in economic and climate projections; critically and quantitatively analyze environmental management and policy proposals; understand complex connections among the many forces that will shape our future; and improve methods to model, monitor and verify greenhouse gas emissions and climatic impacts.This reprint is intended to communicate research results and improve public understanding of global environment and energy challenges, thereby contributing to informed debate about climate change and the economic and social implications of policy alternatives. Abstract: This paper analyzes hybrid emissions trading systems (ETS) under partitioned environmental regulation when firms' abatement costs and future emissions are uncertain. We show that hybrid policies that introduce bounds on the price or the quantity of abatement provide a way to hedge against differences in marginal abatement costs across partitions. Price bounds are more efficient than abatement bounds as they also use information on firms' abatement technologies while abatement bounds can only address emissions uncertainty. Using a numerical stochastic optimization model with equilibrium constraints for the European carbon market, we find that introducing hybrid policies in EU ETS reduces expected excess abatement costs of achieving targeted emissions reductions under EU climate policy by up to 89 percent. We also find that under partitioned regulation there is a high likelihood for hybrid policies to yield sizeable ex-post cost reductions. -Ronald G. Prinn and John M. Reilly, Joint Program Co-Directors MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change

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Financial Intermediation and Deposit Contracts: A Strategic View

Cited by 6 publications

References 17 publications

Use Rights for Common Pool Resources and Economic Development

Use Rights for Common Pool Resources and Economic Development

Household Heterogeneity, Aggregation, and the Distributional Impacts of Environmental Taxes

Combining Price and Quantity Controls Under Partitioned Environmental Regulation

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