Financing constraints, equity pledge and the quality of information disclosure

Abstract

The application of big data in enterprise management is more and more common. With the data of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2018, this paper examines the influence of controlling shareholders equity pledge on the quality of information disclosure and the moderating effect of financing constraints in the age of big data. There are two key findings. First, the controlling shareholders will take opportunistic action to reduce the quality of information disclosure so as to maintain the stock price and avoid the loss of control. And the higher the proportion of equity pledged, the stronger the incentive. Second, this phenomenon is influenced by the financing constraints, which means the negative relationship between equity pledge and the quality of information disclosure is more significant in high financing constraint enterprise than in low financing constraint enterprise. The above conclusions provide enlightenment for optimizing enterprise information disclosure in the era of big data.