First-Person Thought

Morgan, Daniel; Salje, Léa

doi:10.1093/analys/anz089

Analysis

2019

DOI: 10.1093/analys/anz089

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First-Person Thought

Daniel Morgan

Léa Salje

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Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…See, for example,Cappelen and Dever (2014) for a recent argument against this view. I cannot address their arguments here, but the account of how 'now'-beliefs are connected to action I offer below should serve to illustrate how and why I think such beliefs are essential.4 SeeMorgan and Salje (2020) for an overview of recent work on first-person thought.5 Space here prevents me from addressing challenges to this account, the central one originating withPryor (1999). For what it's worth, I takeColiva (2006Coliva ( , 2017 to have adequately addressed this worry, but I cannot argue for this here.6 In forming a conception of a particular individual, one will draw on concepts of more general categories-for example, my conception of my dog Billy draws on my more general concept 'dog'-and these more general concepts may be acquired on the basis of previous experiences.…”

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confidence: 99%

Now‐thoughts

Romdenh‐Romluc

2021

European J of Philosophy

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Now'-thoughts are often categorised alongside 'I'-thoughts.The word 'I'-(including its counterparts in other languages) and the thoughts typically expressed with it have long been a source of fascination for philosophers. 'I'seemingly behaves in peculiar ways, which many writers take to reflect some interesting features of the thoughts it typically expresses. Whilst the similarities between the behaviour of 'I'and 'now'have often been noted, the latter has received much less attention in the literature. In this paper, I will take some of the most influential ideas and frameworks that have been used to analyse 'I'-thought and draw on phenomenological descriptions of temporal experience to provide an account of 'now'thought. I will argue that a certain important class of 'now'-thoughts do not involve thinking about a particular time and predicating something of it, but instead merely involve registering the presence of events. I will end by sketching an account of how these claims might sit with a theory of the word 'now'. | INTRODUCTIONWhat kind of thoughts are typically expressed by sentences such as 'the meeting is starting now' and 'now my daughter is six years old'? One might think the answer is obvious. The word 'now' refers to a particular time, and a 'now'-utterance says that something is happening then. Correspondingly, the thought expressed involves thinking of a particular time and predicating something of it. However, I will argue that matters are not so simple.'Now'-thoughts are often categorised alongside 'I'-thoughts. The word 'I' (including its counterparts in other languages) and the thoughts typically expressed with it have long been a source of fascination for philosophers.'I' seemingly behaves in peculiar ways, which many writers take to reflect some interesting features of the thoughts it typically expresses. Whilst writers such as Castañeda (1966, 1967, 1969) and Perry (1977Perry ( , 1979 have pointed out similarities between the behaviour of 'I' and 'now', the latter has received much less attention in the literature. 1 In this study, I will take some of the most influential ideas and frameworks that have been used to analyse 'I'-thought

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Now‐thoughts

Romdenh‐Romluc

2021

European J of Philosophy

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“…Boer and Lycan (1980), Cappelen and Dever (2013), Devitt (2013), Douven (2013), García-Carpintero (2017), Ninan (2016), Magidor (2015), Shaw (2020), Spencer (2007), Torre (2018). See Morgan and Salje (2020) for a recent review.…”

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Conscious perception in favour of essential indexicality

Sebastián¹

2022

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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It has been widely acknowledged that indexical thought poses a problem for traditional theories of mental content. However, recent work in philosophy has defied this received view and challenged its defenders not to rely on intuitions but rather to clearly articulate what the problem is supposed to be. For example, in "The Inessential Indexical", Cappelen and Dever claim that there are no philosophically interesting or important roles played by essential indexical representations. This paper assesses the role of essential indexicality in understanding the content of perception and argues that, if the perceptual experiences of different subjects can have the same phenomenology, and thus share a representational content (phenomenal content)-assumptions shared by a well-established research project, including a wide variety of theories-, then phenomenal content exhibit a particular kind of essential indexicality (perspectival). I also discuss how the argument is immune to Cappelen and Dever's objections to the idea that the content of perceptual experiences is essentially indexical.

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First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem

Sebastián

2022

Erkenn

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First-Person Thought

Cited by 7 publications

References 75 publications

Now‐thoughts

Now‐thoughts

Conscious perception in favour of essential indexicality

First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem

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