FLoc : Dependable Link Access for Legitimate Traffic in Flooding Attacks

Lee, Soo B.; Gligor, Virgil D.

doi:10.21236/ada580050

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 17 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We configure S5 and S6 to send 10 Mbps traffic and observe how the under-subscribed bandwidth by those ASes is reallocated to other ASes. The congested router (i.e., P3) performs per-path fair bandwidth control using a token bucket mechanism [20], where individual paths are assigned separate token buckets. The remaining routers operate drop-tail queues to model the legacy part of the Internet.…”

Section: Persistent Tcp Flowsmentioning

confidence: 99%

CoDef

Lee

Kang

Gligor

2013

Proceedings of the Ninth ACM Conference on Emerging Networking Experiments and Technologies

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Large-scale botnet attacks against Internet links using low-rate flows cannot be effectively countered by any of the traditional rate-limiting and flow-filtering mechanisms deployed in individual routers. In this paper, we present a collaborative defense mechanism, called CoDef, which enables routers to distinguish low-rate attack flows from legitimate flows, and protect legitimate traffic during botnet attacks. CoDef enables autonomous domains that are uncontaminated by bots to collaborate during link flooding attacks and reroute their customers' legitimate traffic in response to requests from congested routers. Collaborative defense using multi-path routing favors legitimate traffic while limiting the bandwidth available to attack traffic at a congested link. We present CoDef's design and evaluate its effectiveness by exploring the domain-level pathdiversity of the Internet and performing simulations under various traffic conditions.

show abstract

Section: Persistent Tcp Flowsmentioning

confidence: 99%