“…26Although Christensen (2007: 200–1) seems to implicitly endorse appealing to the original evidence in a case like this, his theoretical commitment to Independence may prohibit this appeal. (However, Lord (2014) and Kelly (2013) argue that the verdicts Christensen wants might require appealing to the original evidence in the way I'm suggesting.) Things are more complicated in Christensen (2011) because although he doesn't endorse this appeal in his discussion of similar cases, he (2011: 18) admits that there are unresolved issues about the scope of Independence.…”
The “Evidentialist Dictum” says we must believe what our evidence supports, and the “Fallibility Norm” says we must take our fallibility into account when managing our beliefs. This paper presents a problem for the Evidentialist Dictum based in the Fallibility Norm and a particular conception of evidential support. It then addresses two novel Evidentialist responses to this problem. The first response solves the problem by claiming that fallibility information causes “evidence-loss.” In addition to solving the problem, this response appears to explain what's wrong with certain illegitimate dismissals of misleading evidence. However, this explanation opens it up to objections. Next, I consider and pose challenges to an Evidentialist strategy that attempts to solve the problem by converting accounts of fallibility's epistemic significance for rational belief into principles of evidential support. I conclude by sketching a solution that allows us to capture what's true in the Evidentialist Dictum and the Fallibility Norm.
“…26Although Christensen (2007: 200–1) seems to implicitly endorse appealing to the original evidence in a case like this, his theoretical commitment to Independence may prohibit this appeal. (However, Lord (2014) and Kelly (2013) argue that the verdicts Christensen wants might require appealing to the original evidence in the way I'm suggesting.) Things are more complicated in Christensen (2011) because although he doesn't endorse this appeal in his discussion of similar cases, he (2011: 18) admits that there are unresolved issues about the scope of Independence.…”
The “Evidentialist Dictum” says we must believe what our evidence supports, and the “Fallibility Norm” says we must take our fallibility into account when managing our beliefs. This paper presents a problem for the Evidentialist Dictum based in the Fallibility Norm and a particular conception of evidential support. It then addresses two novel Evidentialist responses to this problem. The first response solves the problem by claiming that fallibility information causes “evidence-loss.” In addition to solving the problem, this response appears to explain what's wrong with certain illegitimate dismissals of misleading evidence. However, this explanation opens it up to objections. Next, I consider and pose challenges to an Evidentialist strategy that attempts to solve the problem by converting accounts of fallibility's epistemic significance for rational belief into principles of evidential support. I conclude by sketching a solution that allows us to capture what's true in the Evidentialist Dictum and the Fallibility Norm.
“… Along these lines, Christensen gives us the following principle: Independence : In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another's expressed belief about P, to determine how (or whether) to modify my own belief about P, I should do so in a way that doesn't rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief that P. (2009, 758) Similar principles are endorsed in Elga (), Frances (), Kornblith (), and Matheson (). For a critical discussion see also Kelly (), Lackey (), Lord (), and Sosa ().…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similar principles are endorsed in Elga (), Frances (), Kornblith (), and Matheson (). For a critical discussion see also Kelly (), Lackey (), Lord (), and Sosa ().…”
“…This case was originally presented inChristensen (2007). 5 For a sample, seeKelly (2005Kelly ( , 2010Kelly ( , 2013,Frances (2010),Lackey (2010),Sosa (2010), andLord (2014). These philosophers are not always attacking Independence under the label 'Independence', but Christensen (2011) makes it clear that this is a view they are attacking.…”
An important principle in the epistemology of disagreement is Independence, which states, “In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another's expressed belief about P, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own belief about P, I should do so in a way that doesn't rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief about P” (Christensen 2011: 1–2). I present a series of new counterexamples to both Independence and also a revised, more widely applicable, version of it. I then formulate and endorse a third version of Independence that avoids those counterexamples. Lastly, I show how this third version of Independence reveals two new ways one may remain steadfast in the face of two real life disagreements: one about God's existence and one about moral realism.
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