Functional individuation, mechanistic implementation: the proper way of seeing the mechanistic view of concrete computation

Abstract

I examine a major objection to the mechanistic view of concrete computation, stemming from an apparent tension between the abstract nature of computational explanation and the tenets of the mechanistic framework: while computational explanation is medium-independent, the mechanistic framework insists on the importance of providing some degree of structural detail about the systems target of the explanation. I show that a common reply to the objection, i.e. that mechanistic explanation of computational systems involves only weak structural constraints, is not enough to save the standard mechanistic view of computation-it trivialises the appeal to mechanism, and thus makes the account collapse into a purely functional view. I claim, however, that the objection can be put to rest once the account is appropriately amended: computational individuation is indeed functional, while mechanistic explanation plays a role in accounting for computational implementation. Since individuation and implementation are crucial elements in a satisfying account of computation in physical systems, mechanism keeps its central importance in the theory of concrete computation. Finally, I argue that my version of the mechanistic view helps to provide a convincing reply to a powerful objection against non-semantic theories of concrete computation: the argument from the multiplicity of computations.

Social-Computation-Supporting Kinds

“…On the other end, we find more restrictive accounts, e.g., syntactic (Fodor 1975(Fodor , 1981 and mechanistic accounts (Piccinini 2015;Coelho Mollo 2018). On these accounts, computing systems are typically distinguished by a stance-independent function.…”

Computing in the nick of time

“…More recent defenses include (among others): Chalmers (2011); Chirimuuta (2014Chirimuuta ( , 2018; Coelho Mollo (2018); Gallistel and King (2011); Weiskopf (2011).…”

Integrating computation into the mechanistic hierarchy in the cognitive and neural sciences

“…Instead, medium-dependent details are taken to explain by decomposition of the phenomena. On the separate-hierarchies picture implementation can be considered to have a non-mechanistic explanatory role: it explains how the explanandum, as well as the computational hierarchy are implemented (see (Coelho Mollo, 2018)).…”

“…Several authors have recently suggested that computational explanations are a species of mechanistic explanation (Kaplan, 2011;Kaplan and Craver, 2011;Piccinini and Craver, 2011;Milkowski, 2013;Piccinini, 2015;Boone and Piccinini, 2016;Coelho Mollo, 2018;Dewhurst, 2018). The focus of most of these accounts is the neurocognitive sciences, in which computational models and explanations are central to the scientific investigation.…”

“…Haugeland (1981) describes them as "formal" (see also (Fodor, 1980)). Piccinini (2015) describes computational properties as "mathematical" or "formal", and others have suggested that, regarding computations, the relevant physical properties of the implementing physical systems are only their degrees of freedom (Piccinini and Bahar, 2013;Coelho Mollo, 2018). 2 While it seems straightforward to associate the computational explanations discussed here with Marr's computational level (1982), algorithmic descriptions of a system can also be abstract and computational in the meaning we discuss here, as long as they are 'medium-independent'.…”