Gain: Practical Key-Recovery Attacks on Round-reduced PAEQ

Saha, Dhiman; Kakarla, Sourya; Mandava, Srinath; Chowdhury, Debashish

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-49445-6_11

Cited by 4 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…However, the eight-round attack dropped the last S as the authors argued that to be a requirement for their approach. This limitation was overcome in [12] by the same authors using an internal-differential approach at the cost of higher data complexity. The state-of-the-art of PAEQ cryptanalysis is summarised in Table 3.…”

Section: Previous Cryptanalysis Of Paeqmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It was earlier stated that Saha et al reported key recovery attacks on pseudo [where the last shuffle was dropped] eight rounds [11] and extended it to full eight rounds using an ID strategy [12]. The attack proposed by them progressed in three phases: forward, backward, and MITM.…”

Section: Description Of the Basic Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This phase resembles the forward phase of the GAIN 8 ⋆ attack in [12]. However, we will need only one trail in comparison with four trails required in [12]. Despite the resemblance, we restate this phase below for brevity.…”

Section: Id Phasementioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, GAD is a simple but effective technique where, as the name suggests, the idea is to guess a part of the state to determine another part primarily exploiting low diffusion. It has found some recent applications in cryptanalysis of some CAESAR candidates [10][11][12]. The current work tries to simultaneously use both the above techniques to arrive at a kind of match-in-the-end (MITE) scenario.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

D inamite : internal differential match‐in‐the‐end attack on eight‐round PAEQ

Saha

Kakarla

Chowdhury

2019

IET Information Security

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Section: Previous Cryptanalysis Of Paeqmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Description Of the Basic Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Id Phasementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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D inamite : internal differential match‐in‐the‐end attack on eight‐round PAEQ

Saha

Kakarla

Chowdhury

2019

IET Information Security

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“…They have extended their work for 16-round AESQ permutation and shown a distinguisher with complexity 2 192 using 2 128 memory. A key recovery attack has also been devised on PAEQ targeting the diffusion of the AESQ permutation by Saha et al [SKMC16]. They have proposed a 8-round key recovery with complexity of 2 48 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Yoyo Tricks with AES-based Permutations

Saha

Rahman

Paul

2018

ToSC

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In Asiacrypt 2017, Rønjom et al. reported some interesting generic properties of SPNs, leading to what they call the Yoyo trick, and applied it to find the most efficient distinguishers on AES. In this work, we explore the Yoyo idea in distinguishing public permutations for the first time. We introduce the notion of nested zero difference pattern which extends the Yoyo idea and helps to compose it using improbable and impossible differential strategies to penetrate higher number of rounds. We devise a novel inside-out application of Yoyo which enables us to start the Yoyo game from an internal round. As an application, we investigate the AES-based public permutation AESQ used inside the authenticated cipher PAEQ. We achieve the first deterministic distinguisher of AESQ up to 8 rounds and the first 9-round distinguisher of AESQ that start from the first round with a practical complexity of around 226. We manage to augment Yoyo with improbable and impossible differentials leading to distinguishers on 9, 10, 12 rounds with complexities of about 22, 228, 2126 respectively. Further, with impossible differentials and a bi-directional Yoyo strategy, we obtain a 16-round impossible differential distinguisher with a complexity of 2126. Our results outperform all previous records on AESQ by a substantial margin. As another application, we apply the proposed strategies on AES in the known-key setting leading to one of the best 8-round known-key distinguisher with a complexity of 230. Finally, this work amplifies the scope of the Yoyo technique as a generic cryptanalysis tool.

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Internal differential fault analysis of parallelizable ciphers in the counter-mode

Saha

Chowdhury

2017

J Cryptogr Eng

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Gain: Practical Key-Recovery Attacks on Round-reduced PAEQ

Cited by 4 publications

References 5 publications

D inamite : internal differential match‐in‐the‐end attack on eight‐round PAEQ

D inamite : internal differential match‐in‐the‐end attack on eight‐round PAEQ

New Yoyo Tricks with AES-based Permutations

Internal differential fault analysis of parallelizable ciphers in the counter-mode

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