Game Models for Ordering and Channel Decisions of New and Differentiated Remanufactured Products in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Sales Efforts

Abstract

Environmental responsibility and economic benefits have promoted the development of closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs), and shortages and channels are considered to be two important issues in a CLSC. This paper explores the ordering and channel decisions in a CLSC with new and differentiated remanufactured products; considers the price and sales-effort-dependent demands, as well as the proportion of emergency orders determined by emergency order costs and backorder losses; and establishes integrated and decentralized CLSC game models. We introduce a stochastic sales effort, which affects two types of products. The numerical results show that sales effort and the order quantity of new and remanufactured products exhibit concave and convex functions, respectively. The upper limit of sales effort has a greater impact on supply chain decisions. High sales efforts can serve as a means of coordinating dispersed supply chains. Moreover, in different cases, the decisions of an integrated channel are better than those of a decentralized channel. Finally, whether the supply chain adopts an emergency order strategy depends on the relative cost of emergency orders and out-of-stock costs. According to this research, some management insights are also provided.

An Analysis of the Impact of Government Subsidies on Emission Reduction Technology Investment Strategies in Low-Carbon Port Operations

“…Consequently, the use of game theory to investigate green emission reduction in low-carbon port operations has gained considerable traction. Currently, the game theories commonly applied in analysing low-carbon port operations include traditional game theories (the Nash game [17,18], the Stackelberg game [19,20,35], and the evolutionary game [21,22,36].…”