Game theoretical transportation network design among multiple regions

Wang, Hua; Zhang, Xiaoning

doi:10.1007/s10479-014-1700-9

Cited by 18 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…The road planner in the upper level determines the network design variable x and congestion pricing variable , based on the responses of travelers being stable at UE. Constraint (2) ensures that any candidate AV link can be either an AV or regular link. Constraint (3) ensures that only regular links can be tolled links for CVs.…”

Section: Model Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…After solving this UE problem for vehicle flows, we find that no AVs run on links (5,6), (6,5), (6,9), (7,8), (8,7), and (8,3) in the initial network. So we exclude these links from the candidate link set and form the following candidate link set: = {(1, 5) , (1,6) , (2,5) , (2, 6) , (5, 7) , (5, 9) , (6,8) , (9, 7) , (9,8) , (7,3) , (7,4) , (8,4)} .…”

Section: Network Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…AV link flow CV link flow (1,5) 35.000 0.000 (1,6) 0.000 35.000 (2,5) 35.000 0.000 (2,6) 0.000 35.000 (5,6) 0.000 0.000 (6,5) 0.000 0.000 (5,7) 55.774 0.000 (5,9) 14.226 0.000 (6,8) 0.000 42.768 (6,9) 0.000 27.232 (9,7) 4.450 18.119 (9,8) 9.775 9.113 (7,8) 0.000 18.119 (8,7) 0.000 0.000 (7,3) 30.000 0.000 (7,4) …”

Section: Journal Of Advanced Transportationunclassified

“…Network design and congestion pricing are classic and effective instruments for solving traffic congestion and have been studied for decades. Some studies have proposed network design strategies [1,2]. Also, some comprehensive reviews have summarized the results of studies of the transportation network design problem (NDP) [3,4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal Design of Transportation Networks with Automated Vehicle Links and Congestion Pricing

Wang

2018

Journal of Advanced Transportation

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We propose a bi-level network design model comprising automated vehicle (AV) links and congestion pricing to improve traffic congestion. As upper-level road planners strive to minimize total travel-time costs by optimizing both the network design and the congestion pricing, lower-level travelers make choices about their routes to minimize their individual travel costs. Our proposed model integrates a network design and congestion pricing to improve traffic congestion and we use a relaxation-based method to solve the model. We conducted a series of numerical tests to analyze the proposed model and solution method. Our results indicate that network design is more effective than congestion pricing when the AV market penetration is high and the opposite is true when AV penetration is low. More importantly, we find that a network design of automated vehicle links with congestion pricing is superior to a single network design or congestion pricing, especially when both AVs and conventional vehicles have a relatively large market penetration.

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Section: Model Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Network Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Journal Of Advanced Transportationunclassified

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal Design of Transportation Networks with Automated Vehicle Links and Congestion Pricing

Wang

2018

Journal of Advanced Transportation

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“…Expanding road network is not efficient, due to the limitation of budget and urban land. Sometimes network expansion is very complicated due to the involvement of various sectors [1]. Parking management provides a new method for urban traffic management.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Parking Management Efficiency Analysis through Various Charge Schemes for Day-Long Commuting considering Elastic Travel Demand

Wang

Tan

Liu

2018

Journal of Advanced Transportation

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In this paper, we investigate the travel pattern of the day-long commuting in a bisection bottleneck network and the efficiency of pricing schemes with elastic travel demand. We extend the Vickrey model to morning and evening commutes and allow commuters to arrive at workplace late and depart from workplace early. The parking searching time is considered in the morning commute. Next, we derive the independent morning and evening commuting travel patterns without road toll and parking fee. Then, we propose three pricing regimes: duration dependent parking fees; optimal time-varying road tolls; optimal time-varying road tolls with duration dependent parking fees. We compare the efficiency of the four schemes with elastic demand. Theoretical analysis and the numerical examples show that optimal time-varying road toll is the most efficient pricing scheme. Charging a duration dependent fee neither improves nor deteriorates the scheme of time-varying road toll, if the toll rates are appropriately set. The regime of duration dependent parking fee only is less efficient than the regime of independent morning and evening commuting travel patterns without road toll and parking fee. In the regime of duration dependent parking fee, the social surplus decreases with the increase of duration dependent parking fee rate.

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Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities

Kóczy

2022

Ann Oper Res

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The Covid-19 epidemic highlighted the significance of externalities: contacts with other people affect the chances of getting infected for our entire network. We study endogenous network formation where not only players or pairs but larger coalitions can, cooperatively change the network. We introduce a model for coalitional network stability for networks with widespread externalities. The network function form generalises the partition function form of cooperative games in allowing the network to be taken into account. The recursive core for network function form games generalises the recursive core for such environments. We present two simple examples to illustrate positive and negative externalities. The first is of a favour network and show that the core is nonempty when players must pay transfers to intermediaries; this simple setting also models economic situations such as airline networks. The second models social contacts during an epidemic and finds social bubbles as the solution.

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Game theoretical transportation network design among multiple regions

Cited by 18 publications

References 44 publications

Optimal Design of Transportation Networks with Automated Vehicle Links and Congestion Pricing

Optimal Design of Transportation Networks with Automated Vehicle Links and Congestion Pricing

Parking Management Efficiency Analysis through Various Charge Schemes for Day-Long Commuting considering Elastic Travel Demand

Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities

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