Gasification in pulverized coal flames. First annual progress report, July 1975--June 1976

Lenzer, R. C.; George, P. E.; Thomas, John F.; Laurendeau, Normand M.

doi:10.2172/7336581

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Most psychologists do not appear to be concerned by this lack of examination. Theorizing should be of secondary significance, they seem to argue, especially if psychology is advancing as a science, According to a particular reading of the philosopher August Comte (Lenzer, 1975), theorizing is considered only a stage to be passed through in the advance toward scientific knowledge. From this perspective, theorizing in the broader and more philosophical sense is the mark of a primitive, prescientific discipline.…”

Section: Situating the Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a theoretical psychology: Should a subdiscipline be formally recognized?

Slife¹,

Williams²

1997

American Psychologist

106

117

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The purpose of this article is (a) to promote careful consideration of a new subdiscipline called theoretical psychology and (b) to invite psychology's evaluation of its own scholarly and intellectual status. Increased signs of disciplinary fragmentation as well as threats to mainstream psychology's philosophy of science have presented challenges that call for thoughtful disciplinary discussion. The authors propose the formal recognition of a subdiscipline whose role is to facilitate this discussion. At the local level, theoretical psychologists should fill a role as consultants to their organization or department, similar to that of statisticians and methodologists. Researchers and practitioners WOUld consult with theoreticians about the types of explanations and methods they are using to see if these approaches are coherent, hold hidden problems, and are appropriate to the assumptions being made. Many psychologists already perform these roles, using a variety of supporting journals, organizations, and institutions. These supports are briefly reviewed, along with anticipated objections to this role and possible considerations for training these professionals. l•pfl•s article responds affirmatively to the question sed in the rifle. Although we attempt to present main arguments for and against the formal recognition of this subdiscipline, our view is that the arguments in favor far outweigh the arguments against. In short, we feel that this is an idea whose time has come. However, we are not naive enough to think that our proposal will not generate considerable controversy. On the contrary, the question of a theoretical subdiscipline raises all sorts of issues that go to the core of the discipline as a whole. Consequently, the question we raise is important to consider not only for the obvious reasons regarding the need for a new subdiscipline (or the need for subdisciplines at all) but also for the inevitable disciplinary selfevaluation this question engenders. From our perspective, this evaluation is precisely why a subdiscipline of theoretical psychology is needed.We begin by attempting to situate the question historically. A historical question related to the title question is as follows: Why has there not been a formally recognized subdiscipline of theoretical psychology to this point? As we show, psychology's stake in being recognized as a science, as well as its particular philosophy of science, is an important part of the answer to this question. Another issue that appears to be embedded in ttie title question is as follows: Why propose a subdiscipline O f theoretical psychology atthis point? We attempt to demonstrate that the philosophy of science long embraced by the discipline, and perhaps even our disciplinary identity, is changing. Part of tl~ purpose of theoretical psychology is to understand this change and to provide informed and formal discourse about what psychology may be changing to.Furthermore, issues that psychology must confront in the current intellectual climate argue for a formal subdisc...

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Section: Situating the Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a theoretical psychology: Should a subdiscipline be formally recognized?

Slife¹,

Williams²

1997

American Psychologist

106

117

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…My claim is that the arguments rehearsed across these three books are indispensable to understanding adequately "Bauman's method" as they provide the foundations upon which all of his better-known insights are subsequently built. In the two earlier books, Bauman takes apart the French combination of positivism and functionalism developed by Comte (Lenzer, 2017(Lenzer, [1975), Durkheim (Lukes, 1982) and Parsons (Parsons andShils, 2017 [1951])somewhat unfairly lampooned as the 'Durksonian Consensus'whom Bauman holds responsible for the false entrenchment of quantitative empirical research in sociology. His chief complaint is that positivism seeks to provide technicallyuseful knowledge for administrators in the service of the State and/or the Market for the express purposes of social control.…”

Section: ) Describesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hermeneutics contra fundamentalism: Zygmunt Bauman’s method for thinking in dark times

Davis

2020

Thesis Eleven

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Faced with a rise of populism seemingly in all corners of the globe, the need to facilitate meaningful communication between different world-views and to resist the closing down of dialogue is pressing. In this paper, I argue that Zygmunt Bauman’s sociological method has always been concerned with this problem and that a better appreciation of his writings on hermeneutics provides us with a vital strategy for resisting fundamentalist thinking in today’s dark times. To begin, I briefly explore the relationship between hermeneutics and fundamentalism before moving on to elaborate Bauman’s method of sociological hermeneutics. In the final section of the paper, I assess the implications that Bauman’s method has for the discipline of sociology at a time when the certainty of things is the most avid of dreams dreamed by people harassed and oppressed by the uncertainty of liquid modern life, apparently whatever the human consequences.

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“…Positivism, a form of scientific realism that impacted psychology for decades, was described initially by Auguste Comte, who argued that humankind has seen three major phases in its search for understanding: the theological phase involving a search for God and spirituality, the metaphysical phase involving the search for philosophical truths, and the scientific phase involving the search for facts (Lenzer, 1975). Comte characterized the latter as a search for positive truths that came from the collection of facts and the application of logic independently of human perceptions and conceptions.…”

Section: Scientific Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Realism, Instrumentalism, and Scientific Symbiosis: Psychological Theory as a Search for Truth and the Discovery of Solutions.

Cacioppo

Semin

Berntson

2004

American Psychologist

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S cience, as traditionally conceived, is like interrogating the Greek mythological sea demon, Proteus. Poseidon commissioned him with the minor duty of protecting the seals of the oceans. More pertinent to the subject of our article is a quality Proteus possessed. He was omniscient in matters to do with the seas and could also modify his appearance to anything he wished, any animal, any plant, and even fire. Although elusive in his various appearances, it was possible with judicious interrogation and particularly with the aid of his daughter to extract the truth from him.A distinction made in the philosophy of science is whether theorists seek to discover truths or to create targeted frameworks that provide adequate prediction for some domain of phenomena and help to solve problems regarding that limited domain. The characterization of science as being like Proteus casts the goal of scientific theories as being to describe the world as it really is, independently of human expectations, perceptions, and measurements. Our aim here is to examine the development of scientific realism and instrumentalism in psychology and the implications of each for how we think about, formulate, and evaluate psychological theory.Scientists are, by and large, a practical lot, and it is sensible that readers might ask why any of this matters. Given numerous demands, it is understandable why scientists might adopt measures or methods without thinking exhaustively about the underlying assumptions of these operationalizations or how they fit within a broader set. Such constraints are the stuff of which apocryphal stories are fashioned by philosophers of science. More than 60 years ago, Eddington (1939), in his book A Philosophy of the Physical Sciences, told the story of a hypothetical scientist who sought to study the fish in the seas. The scientist wove a two-inch mesh net and commissioned a ship on which to sail the seas. Once on the high seas, this individual sailed to various sites, lowered the nets, hauled in a catch, measured and cataloged each fish, returned the catch to the deep, folded the nets, and sailed to another site to repeat the procedure. After several years of investigation, the scientist returned to announce there were no fish smaller than two inches in the seas. Taking the time to discuss the measures and methods we use, the underlying assumptions, their strengths and limitations, and the theoretical implications of these operationalizations may pay dividends in the long term in science.If the time scientists characteristically take to consider broadly what their measures mean is the equivalent of a brief gaze, the time taken by many to think about even more abstract philosophical issues such as scientific realism and instrumentalism may be the equivalent of a blink. Scientists tend to inherit rather than select these perspectives. This was certainly true of ourselves. But an inherited

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Gasification in pulverized coal flames. First annual progress report, July 1975--June 1976

Abstract: S-1 -Gasifier selection valve 1/4" high temperature valve On hand S-2. -Gasifier selection valve Same as S-1 On hand

Cited by 3 publications

References 9 publications

Toward a theoretical psychology: Should a subdiscipline be formally recognized?

Toward a theoretical psychology: Should a subdiscipline be formally recognized?

Hermeneutics contra fundamentalism: Zygmunt Bauman’s method for thinking in dark times

Realism, Instrumentalism, and Scientific Symbiosis: Psychological Theory as a Search for Truth and the Discovery of Solutions.

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