Gender Discrimination Estimation in a Search Model With Matching and Bargaining*

Abstract

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Racial discrimination in the U.S. labor market: Employment and wage differentials by skill

“…The model developed in this paper shares several features with other models of taste-based discrimination in a random search environment, like Black (1995), Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), Rosén (2003) and Flabbi (2010). 5 In all these models prejudiced employers incur a psychic cost of employing a worker who belongs to the minority group.…”

“…Opponents of such policies argue that treating two races differently is in direct violation to the Equal Protection Clause of the US Constitution. However, currently, the Supreme Court deems the practice constitutional (see Flabbi (2010) and references therein). These policies work to redress the disadvantage that black workers face compared to equally skilled white workers.…”

“…Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) develop a wage posting model and allow both types of worker to draw their productivity from separate (degenerate) distributions. Rosén (2003) and Flabbi (2010) model the productivity of the match (and not of workers and jobs) as being heterogeneous.…”

“…Indeed, there is substantive evidence of persistent black-white gaps in educational attainment and cognitive skill (see Neal (2006)), which suggests differences in skill across races are likely to play an important role in shaping mean employment and wage differentials. Other models of taste-based employer discrimination have been estimated using structural methods (see Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and Flabbi (2010)). …”

A partner in crime: Assortative matching and bias in the crime market

“…Lang & Lehmann (2012) provide an up-to-date discussion of the literature on discrimination. Looking for evidence of frictions and discrimination in this reduced-form approach, contrasts with structural models on search in the labour market (such as Bartolucci, 2014;Flabbi, 2010). While structural assumptions relax data requirements, the crime market o ers the individual speci c productivity measure of arrest which allows me to pinpoint the presence of a bias intuitively.…”