Global systemically important banks regulation: Blessing or curse?

Markoulis, Stelios; Martzoukos, Spiridon; Patsalidou, Elena

doi:10.1016/j.gfj.2020.100580

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Moreover, Poghosyan, Werger, and de Haan (2016) examined whether Fitch support ratings 4 of U.S. banks depend on bank size, documenting that bank size is indeed positively related to support ratings. Given the above, it is not surprising that the years following the GFC have seen some important regulatory initiatives, which are targeted at large and systemic banks with the aim of mitigating the "moral hazard" problem identified above (e.g., Markoulis et al 2020).…”

Section: Review Of Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Bank distress in the European Union 2008–2015: A closer look at capital, size and revenue diversification

2021

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The recent global financial crisis has clearly highlighted the importance of the timely identification of weak banks. This paper introduces and analyses a new sample of European Union (EU) banks, which faced distress during 2008–2015 and provides evidence regarding the relationship between distress and bank‐specific, macroeconomic, banking sector and stock market distress determinants, paying particular attention to issues that have been central following the crisis, such as capital, size and revenue diversification. Our findings regarding these variables seem to “connect” well with current supervisory actions. The paper also focuses on banks in EU countries that faced economic problems and documents that the probability of distress in these countries has been influenced by different factors, in comparison to the rest of the EU.

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Section: Review Of Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Bank distress in the European Union 2008–2015: A closer look at capital, size and revenue diversification

2021

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“…Banks are regulated based on Basel III principles (Markoulis et al, 2020) using the supervisory framework set by the regulator. The regulatory vector is given below and is different for each bank at each time period.

{Reg}_{b, t} goodbreak= ({},, {italicCapReqVector}_{t}, {italicLCR}_{b, t}) goodbreak= ({},, \{t 1, italicCapB, {CCB}_{t}\}, {italicLCR}_{b, t}),

where, t 1 is the Tier 1 capital requirement ( t 1), CapB is the capital conservation buffer, CCB t is the countercyclical capital buffer and LCR is the liquidity coverage ratio for each bank, based her assets.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Banksmentioning

confidence: 99%

The perfect bail‐in: Financing without banks using peer‐to‐peer lending

2023

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We explore the potential outcomes for financial stability when using peer‐to‐peer lenders to finance economic activity. Combining Random Regression Forests, a machine‐learning process, with an agent‐based model, we perform simulations on artificial economies with various degrees of adoption of peer‐to‐peer lending. We find that as peer‐to‐peer lenders proliferate, there is increased financial instability, lower GDP and higher unemployment. On the other hand, peer‐to‐peer lending increases the total volume of loans given out but demonstrates a preference towards consumer loans (over corporate loans), which has a negative effect in the long run. Finally, introducing peer‐to‐peer lenders increases the access of the unbanked to services which conventional banking is not able to offer within the extant regulatory framework. Our results can help policymakers as they address the issue of regulation in the peer‐to‐peer finance industry.

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Stability versus soundness: what matters for women central bank governors?

Ghosh

2023

Econ Change Restruct

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Global systemically important banks regulation: Blessing or curse?

Cited by 6 publications

References 30 publications

Bank distress in the European Union 2008–2015: A closer look at capital, size and revenue diversification

Bank distress in the European Union 2008–2015: A closer look at capital, size and revenue diversification

The perfect bail‐in: Financing without banks using peer‐to‐peer lending

Stability versus soundness: what matters for women central bank governors?

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