Government Apologies for Historical Injustices

Abstract

Scholars from various disciplines suggest that government apologies for historical injustices fulfill important psychological goals. After reviewing psychological literature that contributes to this discussion, we present a list of elements that political apologies should contain to be acceptable to both members of the victimized minority and the nonvictimized majority. Content coding of a list of government apologies revealed that many, but not all, include most of these elements. We then reviewed research demonstrating that political apologies that contain most of these facets are favorably evaluated, but especially by members of the nonvictimized majority. Next, we examined how the demands of victimized minorities affect their satisfaction with government apologies that lack some components. We conclude by discussing the implications of our analysis for when and how governments should apologize.Throughout history, governments of many countries have committed deliberate discriminatory acts against minorities, ranging from unfair taxes to slavery and mass murder. These government actions were often legal, approved by legislatures and courts as well as the majority of citizens. In retrospect, these actions seem unjust, but what, if anything, should current governments do about them? Sometimes governments respond to charges of historical injustice by downplaying the magnitude of the harm or even denying that the events occurred. For example, despite frequent requests that it acknowledge and apologize for the Armenian

Saying sorry: Shifting obligation after conciliatory acts satisfies perpetrator group members.

“…Research on the perpetrator group has mainly tested the role of group-based self-conscious emotions, suggesting that feelings of shame or collective guilt may increase support for imageimproving behaviors such as apology or reparations (Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010; Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi & Cehajic, 2008;Gausel & Leach, 2011;McGarty, Pedersen, Leach, Mansell, Waller, & Bliuc, 2005). Separately, there is also reason to believe that transgressors have different needs than victims after conflict, including a greater need to restore their moral image Shnabel et al, 2009); that they may support conciliatory acts more after they are given (see Blatz & Philpot, 2010); and that the response of a target group to an offered conciliatory act can evoke various reactions (Harth, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2011).But while there is evidence that perpetrator group members tend to be more satisfied after a conciliatory act than victim group members (see Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009), there is relatively little research on what explains their satisfaction. If the aim of conciliatory acts is to promote reconciliation between the two groups as a whole, this makes it important to understand when and why people on both sides of the group divide will be satisfied with the act (Blatz & Philpot, 2010).…”

“…But while there is evidence that perpetrator group members tend to be more satisfied after a conciliatory act than victim group members (see Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009), there is relatively little research on what explains their satisfaction. If the aim of conciliatory acts is to promote reconciliation between the two groups as a whole, this makes it important to understand when and why people on both sides of the group divide will be satisfied with the act (Blatz & Philpot, 2010).…”

Apologies demanded yet devalued: Normative dilution in the age of apology

“…Notably, this pattern emerged even following a fairly strong apologetic statement, not a perfunctory expression of remorse (see Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009;Steele & Blatz, 2014); the apology information was accompanied by statements from victims acknowledging its sincerity and expressing a desire to move forward. Thus, it is not that the apology was weak, insincere, or ambiguous in its intent.…”

Legal and criminological aspects of the crime of genocide in the Balkanson the Serb population in XX century - Selected Issues

“…Przykładami pierwszego procesu są, zdaniem Kaufmana, Jugosławia i Mołdawia, drugiego zaś konflikty: Ormianie -Azerowie oraz Gruzini -Abchazi. Model Kaufmana dobrze nadaje się do tego, aby po pewnej modyfikacji uży-wać go do wyjaśniania mobilizacji ludobójczej 16 . Konflikt między grupami prowadzący do ludobójstwa lub czystki etnicznej 17 może mieć krótką historię i wynikać z nagłej mobilizacji starych uprzedzeń przez manipulatorskich polityków, ale często jest to konflikt rozciągniety w czasie.…”

“…Społeczeństwo zaangażowane w nierozwiązywalny konflikt musi wytworzyć przekonania społeczne, które pozwoli poradzić sobie z napiętą sytuacją. Owe społeczne przekonanie z jednej strony umacnia społeczeństwo w stawianiu czoła konfliktowi, z drugiej jednak strony, stanowią one inwestycję w konflikt i przedłużają jego trwanie 18 . W przewlekłych konfliktach kwestie sporne postrzegane są jako niedające się pogodzić; antagonizm jawi się uczestnikom jako gra o sumie zerowej.…”