Green Antitrust: Friendly Fire in the Fight against Climate Change

Schinkel, Maarten Pieter; Treuren, Leonard

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3749147

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…In Section 5, we discuss how production agreements that advance and Markets, 2021). See Schinkel and Treuren (2021) for a critical review.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…point out that while consumers' willingness to pay for CSR out of pure altruism may be small, it is boosted by perceived features such as improved performance, health attributes, savings, status and peer pressure.5 Henderson (2020), making a case in Chapter 6 for sustainable palm oil in which all firms agree "pre-competitive" to buy sustainable oil and push for sanctions against those of their competitors who do not behave accordingly, notes that there may be antitrust issues (page 169, footnote 16). For more examples seeSchinkel and Treuren (2021).6 See Scott (2016) for cartel exemption possibilities under U.S. antitrust law, and Holmes (2020) under European competition law.7 See Hovenkamp (2019).8 In CECED (1999), the European Commission allowed washing machine producers to agree to take their least energy-efficient models collectively off the market. Yet the avoided emissions, though substantial, were not pivotal to the decision.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Several other antitrust agencies are following suit.35 In fact, so rich are benefits elsewhere likely to be, that a risk of this "citizens' welfare standard" is that it will become hard for the competition authority to say "no" to production agreements at all. SeeSchinkel and Treuren (2021) for an elaborate discussion.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Corporate Social Responsibility by Joint Agreement

Schinkel

Treuren

2021

SSRN Journal

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Industry-wide voluntary agreements are touted as a means for corporations to take more corporate social responsibility (CSR). We study what type of joint CSR agreement induces firms to increase CSR efforts in a model of oligopolistic competition with differentiated products. Consumers have a willingness to pay for more responsibly manufactured products. Firms are driven by profit, and possibly by intrinsic motivation, to invest in costly CSR efforts. We find that cooperative agreements directly on the level of CSR reduce CSR efforts compared to competition. Such agreements throttle both for-profit and intrinsic motivations for CSR. CSR efforts only increase if agreements are permitted solely on output. Such production agreements, however, reduce total welfare in the market and raise antitrust concerns. Taking externalities into account may help to justify a production agreement under a total welfare standard, but not agreements on CSR directly. Moreover, simply requiring a higher CSR level by regulation while preserving competition always gives higher within-market welfare.

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“…In Section 5, we discuss how production agreements that advance and Markets, 2021). See Schinkel and Treuren (2021) for a critical review.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Corporate Social Responsibility by Joint Agreement

Schinkel

Treuren

2021

SSRN Journal

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“…SeeBrau and Carraro (2011).19 The Dutch competition authority proposes this in Authority for Consumers and Markets (2021). SeeSchinkel and Treuren (2021) for a critical review.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Several other antitrust agencies are following suit, but not DG Competition, see European Commission (2021).38 In fact, so rich are benefits elsewhere likely to be, that a risk of this 'citizens' welfare standard' is that it will become hard for the competition authority to say no to production agreements at all. SeeSchinkel and Treuren (2021) for an elaborate discussion.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Social Responsibility by Joint Agreement

Schinkel,

Treuren

2021

SSRN Journal

Self Cite

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Industry-wide voluntary agreements are touted as a means for corporations to take more corporate social responsibility (CSR). We study what type of joint CSR agreement induces competitors to increase CSR efforts in a model of oligopolistic competition with differentiated products. Consumers have a willingness to pay for more responsibly manufactured products. Firms are driven by profit, and are also possibly intrinsically motivated, to invest in CSR efforts. We find that cooperative agreements directly on the level of CSR reduce CSR efforts compared to competition. Such agreements throttle both for-profit and intrinsic motivation for CSR. CSR efforts only increase if agreements are permitted solely on output. Such production agreements, however, reduce total welfare in the market and raise antitrust concerns. Taking externalities into account may help justify a production agreement under a broader welfare standard, but not agreements on CSR directly. Moreover, simply requiring a higher CSR level by regulation while preserving competition always gives higher within-market welfare.

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Partially observable corporate social responsibility: The limits of differentiation

Calveras

Sákovics

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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We investigate investment incentives in credence corporate social responsibility under different market structures. In duopoly, for high enough investment transparency (IT), exactly one firm invests in the clean technology: They differentiate their products. If the firms merge, with high enough IT and product traceability, the monopolist also invests in (only) one plant, but the necessary IT for investment is higher. Without product traceability, whenever the monopolist invests, it is in both plants, but the IT required for investment is even higher. We conclude that “green” competition policy must be nuanced, taking into account (or regulating) both transparency and traceability.

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Green Antitrust: Friendly Fire in the Fight against Climate Change

Cited by 12 publications

References 57 publications

Corporate Social Responsibility by Joint Agreement

Corporate Social Responsibility by Joint Agreement

Corporate Social Responsibility by Joint Agreement

Partially observable corporate social responsibility: The limits of differentiation

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