Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators

Rosas, Guillermo; Langston, Joy

doi:10.1017/s0022381611000326

Cited by 72 publications

(74 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…The other major parties in the legislature were the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). Most analysts would place both the PRD and the PRI to the left of the PAN (in order from left to right: PRD, PRI, PAN) (Rosas and Langston 2011). However, the PRD and the PRI did not form an official coalition in opposition to the government.…”

Section: Position Taking and Party Unitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Strategic Use of Legislative Voting Procedures

Crisp

Driscoll

2012

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Legislative votes can be taken by roll call—noting the position of each individual member—or by some form of indication (sitting or standing, shouting yea or nay, etc.)—noting only an aggregate outcome. Cameral rules define one method of voting as the standard operating procedure and how to invoke any alternative voting methods. We develop a series of hypotheses related to position taking to explain why, when procedures would typically lead to a vote taken by indication, legislators choose to vote by roll call—a means that makes it much easier for actors outside the chamber to observe the positions taken by individual legislators and partisan blocs. With data from Argentina and Mexico, we test these hypotheses regarding the strategic choice of vote procedures and their relationship to observed party unity.

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Section: Position Taking and Party Unitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Strategic Use of Legislative Voting Procedures

Crisp

Driscoll

2012

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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“…Previous explanations that highlight gubernatorial influence in the candidate selection process are overstated (Cantú & Desposato, 2012;Langston, 2010;Rosas & Langston, 2011), suggesting at a minimum that multiple principals influence the candidate selection process. Previous explanations that highlight gubernatorial influence in the candidate selection process are overstated (Cantú & Desposato, 2012;Langston, 2010;Rosas & Langston, 2011), suggesting at a minimum that multiple principals influence the candidate selection process.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

(Sub)national Principals, Legislative Agents

Kerevel

2015

Comparative Political Studies

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To what extent do external actors control the careers of national legislators in federal systems? Although previous research has demonstrated that multiple principals shape legislative behavior in federal systems, prior studies have been much less successful at demonstrating the relative power of each of these actors over the careers of federal legislators. Using an original data set on the career paths of Mexican federal legislators, this study seeks to determine the relative importance of governors, presidents, and other party elites in shaping the future career choices of national legislators in federal systems. I find that legislators who share partisanship with the president or their governor are more likely to obtain patronage positions, while party leaders predominantly control access to the ballot. The findings also suggest that while governors and presidents can influence a subset of legislators, the large majority of legislators pursue future positions over which party leaders control access.

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“…En este sentido, David Samuels (2000Samuels ( , 2003Samuels ( , 2008Samuels ( , 2011 señaló que por la relevancia de la dinámica política subnacional o estadual los diputados buscan posiciones fuera de la legislatura que, en última instancia, se convierte en una ambición "extralegislativa" o "regresiva", de acuerdo con Botero (2011), algo que también ocurre entre los legisladores en México (Langston & Aparicio, 2008;Rosas & Langston, 2011). Esto se entiende por las características propias que pueden adquirir las carreras políticas en sistemas federales, tal como Brasil y México.…”

Section: Estado De La Cuestiónunclassified

“…En este nuevo escenario post crisis 2001, los gobernadores pasaron a ser no solo actores con preeminencia subnacional (Benton, 2003) sino también figuras destacadas con amplia capacidad para influir en lo nacional, especialmente en los legislativos nacionales (Coronel & Zamichiei, 2009a, 2009b, 2012a, 2012bRosas & Langston, 2011;Samuels & Abrucio, 2000) y lograron ser considerados como los actores más importantes en Argentina luego del Presidente y algunos pocos ministros (Jones 1997(Jones , 2001. A pesar de ser la figura por excelencia subnacional, en los últimos tiempos los vicegobernadores también han cobrado un relevante protagonismo en la política nacional 1 (Suárez & Inchauspe 2013a, 2013c.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Aproximación a los perfiles de los vicegobernadores argentinos (2003-2015)

Suárez

2016

apolit

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Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators

Cited by 72 publications

References 21 publications

The Strategic Use of Legislative Voting Procedures

The Strategic Use of Legislative Voting Procedures

(Sub)national Principals, Legislative Agents

Aproximación a los perfiles de los vicegobernadores argentinos (2003-2015)

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