Guns and Votes

Abstract

Why are U.S. congressmen reluctant to support gun control regulations, despite the fact that most Americans are in favor of them? We argue that re-election motives can lead politicians to take a pro-gun stance against the interests of an apathetic majority of the electorate, but in line with the interests of an intense minority. We develop a model of gun control choices in which incumbent politicians are both office and policy motivated, and voters differ in the direction and intensity of their preferences. We derive conditions under which politicians support gun control early in their terms, but oppose them when they approach re-election. We test the predictions of the model by analyzing votes on gun-related legislation in the U.S. Senate, in which one third of the members are up for re-election every two years. We find that senators are more likely to vote pro gun when they are close to facing re-election, a result which holds comparing both across and within legislators. Only Democratic senators "flip flop'' on gun control, and only if the group of pro-gun voters in their constituency is of intermediate size.

Planting in Fertile Soil: The National Rifle Association and State Firearms Legislation*

“…The ability of the NRA to bring its members to the voting booth is consistent with Bouton et al. (), who found that timing matters enormously in the NRA's influence: senators (particularly Democratic incumbents) are most likely to shift in a pro‐gun direction in the lead up to a reelection.…”

Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections

“…Bouton, Conconi, Pino, and Zanardi (2013) describe a probabilistic voting model in which politicians may pander to the interests of a vocal minority on an issue which the rest of the electorate cares less intensely about.…”

“…Recent work by Bouton, Conconi, Pino, and Zanardi (2013) and Conconi, Pino, and Zanardi (2013) shows that, when U.S. senators approach reelection, they are more likely to take a pro-gun stance when voting on gun control regulations and a green stance when voting on environmental policies. Like trade, gun control and the environment are "secondary" policy issues, which do not shape the decisions of most voters.…”

Suspiciously timed trade disputes

“…Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi, 2014;Bouton, Conconi, Pino, and Zanardi, 2014;Conconi, Pino, and Zanardi, 2015). Our theoretical model builds on the sequential reciprocity framework developed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).…”