Handbook of Carbon Offset Programs

Kollmuss, Anja; Lazarus, Michael; Lee, Carrie M.

doi:10.4324/9781849774932

Cited by 50 publications

(28 citation statements)

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“…Considerable discretion by CARB-CAR stakeholders appear to explain protocol inconsistencies; documentation for revisions is not provided. Protocol discretion, including increasing acceptance of default values for protocol components have been documented for related protocols (Kollmuss & Fussler, 2015) consistent with CAR -CAR protocol observations reported here.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 82%

California air resources board forest carbon protocol invalidates offsets

Marino

Mincheva

Doucett

2019

PeerJ

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The commercial asset value of sequestered forest carbon is based on protocols employed globally; however, their scientific basis has not been validated. We review and analyze commercial forest carbon protocols, claimed to have reduced net greenhouse gas emissions, issued by the California Air Resources Board and validated by the Climate Action Reserve (CARB-CAR). CARB-CAR forest carbon offsets, based on forest mensuration and model simulation, are compared to a global database of directly measured forest carbon sequestration, or net ecosystem exchange (NEE) of forest CO2. NEE is a meteorologically based method integrating CO2 fluxes between the atmosphere, forest and soils and is independent of the CARB-CAR methodology. Annual carbon accounting results for CAR681 are compared with NEE for the Ameriflux site, Howland Forest Maine, USA, (Ho-1), the only site where both methods were applied contemporaneously, invalidating CARB-CAR protocol offsets. We then test the null hypothesis that CARB-CAR project population data fall within global NEE population values for natural and managed forests measured in the field; net annual gC m−2yr−1 are compared for both protocols. Irrespective of geography, biome and project type, the CARB-CAR population mean is significantly different from the NEE population mean at the 95% confidence interval, rejecting the null hypothesis. The CARB-CAR population exhibits standard deviation ∼5× that of known interannual NEE ranges, is overcrediting biased, incapable of detecting forest transition to net positive CO2 emissions, and exceeds the 5% CARB compliance limit for invalidation. Exclusion of CO2 efflux via soil and ecosystem respiration precludes a valid net carbon accounting result for CARB-CAR and related protocols, consistent with our findings. Protocol invalidation risk extends to vendors and policy platforms such as the United Nations Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) and the Paris Agreement. We suggest that CARB-CAR and related protocols include NEE methodology for commercial forest carbon offsets to standardize methods, ensure in situ molecular specificity, verify claims of carbon emission reduction and harmonize carbon protocols for voluntary and compliance markets worldwide.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 82%

California air resources board forest carbon protocol invalidates offsets

Marino

Mincheva

Doucett

2019

PeerJ

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“…It is desirable to link PES only with those ES that would not have occurred otherwise (ie to require additionality; Kollmuss et al . 2008).…”

Section: Pes: Background and Design Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to sell ecosystem services: a guide for designing new markets

Banerjee

Secchi

Fargione

et al. 2013

Frontiers in Ecol & Environ

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Payments for ecosystem services (PES) can improve environmental quality by aligning the incentives of individual landowners with societal interests in providing valuable ecosystem services such as carbon storage, water quality, flood control, and wildlife habitat. However, for this potential to be realized, many institutional details and technical challenges must be addressed. In this review, we discuss six critical issues for creating effective PES markets: using the appropriate type of market institution, defining suitable spatial and temporal scales for the market, promoting additionality (avoiding payments for services that would have been provided even in the absence of payments) so that payments result in increased services, offering incentives for projects that generate multiple ecosystem services, considering practice‐based versus performance‐based payments, and eliminating opportunities for strategic behavior aimed at “gaming the system”. We illustrate these issues with an example of how PES could be applied to floodplain restoration.

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“…Unintended side-effects . Emission reduction projects can have unintended negative side-effects, for instance, secondary environmental problems (compare Kollmuss et al , 2008).…”

Section: Voluntary Carbon Offsettingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Buying Low, Flying High: Carbon Offsets and Partial Compliance

Spiekermann

2013

Political Studies

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Many companies offer their customers voluntary carbon 'offset' certificates to compensate for greenhouse gas emissions. Voluntary offset certificates are cheap because the demand for them is low, allowing consumers to compensate for their emissions without significant sacrifices. Regarding the distribution of emission reduction responsibilities I argue that excess emissions are permissible if they are offset properly. However, if individuals buy offsets only because they are cheap, they fail to be robustly motivated to choose a permissible course of action. This suspected lack of robust motivation raises both pragmatic questions about the functioning of offsetting schemes and moral questions about the worth of such unstable motives. The analysis provided here also has wider implications for the normative analysis of partial compliance and 'many hands' problems, especially for those cases where compliance levels and costs interact. AbstractMany companies offer their customers voluntary carbon 'offset' certificates to compensate for greenhouse gas emissions. Voluntary offset certificates are cheap because the demand for them is low, allowing consumers to compensate for their emissions without significant sacrifices. Regarding the distribution of emission reduction responsibilities I argue that excess emissions are permissible if they are offset properly. However, if individuals buy offsets only because they are cheap, they fail to be robustly motivated to choose a permissible course of action. This suspected lack of robust motivation raises both pragmatic questions about the functioning of offsetting schemes and moral questions about the worth of such unstable motives. The analysis provided here also has wider implications for the normative analysis of partial compliance and 'many hands' problems, especially for those cases where compliance levels and costs interact.

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Handbook of Carbon Offset Programs

Cited by 50 publications

References 0 publications

California air resources board forest carbon protocol invalidates offsets

California air resources board forest carbon protocol invalidates offsets

How to sell ecosystem services: a guide for designing new markets

Buying Low, Flying High: Carbon Offsets and Partial Compliance

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