How do electoral and voice accountability affect corruption? Experimental evidence from Egypt

Mansour, Sarah; Wallace, Sally; Sadiraj, Vjollca; Hassan, Mazen

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101994

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Por otra parte, en la democracia como sistema de gobierno, la corrupción puede generar efectos paradójicos, tal y como se ha mostrado experimentalmente. Un experi-mento realizado en Egipto (Mansour, Wallace, Sadiraj, & Hassan, 2021), donde un funcionario puede elegir entre (i) quedarse todo para si o (ii) repartirlo por igual entre todos los contribuyentes bajo cuatro condiciones experimentales -dos democráticas y dos autocráticas: (d1) el funcionario es elegido democráticamente o (a1) nombrado autocráticamente y (d2) los contribuyentes pueden enviar mensajes de protesta a este oficial y entre ellos o (a2) no pueden enviar mensajes de protesta, encuentran que:…”

Section: Condiciones a Tener En Cuenta Para Diseñar Instituciones I I...unclassified

Corrupción: ampliando el alcance

García

2022

Tendencias

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En este artículo se propone una definición múltiple de corrupción que tome en consideración los tres tipos de corrupción -individual, institucional y sistémica- susceptibles de ser encontradas en cualquier régimen político. La corrupción no aparece como una conducta «excepcional» o «anormal» sino en directa continuidad con la propensión humana a la cooperación. Se evidencia como la corrupción sistémica ha sido conceptualizada como causa del cambio de régimen político en la tradición política occidental; esta relación causal es muy relevante para explicar las actuales amenazas a las democracias modernas. Se estudian en detalle los impactos de los diferentes tipos de corrupción y se procede al cuestionamiento de la teoría del ciclo de vida de la corrupción y su relación con desarrollo económico. Se señala la necesidad de diferentes y mejores mediciones de la corrupción, que den cuenta de la corrupción sistémica, y de nuevas instituciones diseñadas para revertir su generalización en las democracias modernas.

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Section: Condiciones a Tener En Cuenta Para Diseñar Instituciones I I...unclassified

Corrupción: ampliando el alcance

García

2022

Tendencias

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“…For instance, in the USA, tax revenues were negatively affected at the time of the Vietnam war. Moreover, in governments that are unpopular or distrusted, tax compliance is usually used by the citizens to convey a message of dissatisfaction (Mansour et al, 2021). Some studies have looked at this relationship from a psychological and cognitive angle.…”

Section: Empathy and Tax Compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

How can tax compliance be incentivized? An experimental examination of voice and empathy

AbdelNabi

Wanas²,

Mansour

2021

REPS

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PurposeTax evasion is an economic crime that nearly all world countries suffer from. Its consequences are countless, including poor public spending on infrastructure projects and social welfare programs, low economic growth and development, institutional mistrust and fiscal deficits. For developing countries in particular, targeting development programs and infrastructural investments requires an efficient tax collection policy to generate sufficient funds for such purposes. This makes the tax evasion problem a critical one and countering it extremely policy relevant. Based on evidence that shows how the understanding of taxpayers' behavior is an essential factor in fighting evasion, this paper aims to test different factors that might incentivize citizens using a behavioral and experimental approach, in non-Western educated industrialized rich democracies (non-WEIRD) countries, to comply more.Design/methodology/approachThis paper uses a survey experiment to examine the impact of different behavioral primes on tax compliance behavior. Specifically, it observes subjects' compliance behavior in two contexts: voice and empathy. A total of 273 students from a big public university in Egypt were randomly selected to participate in this study.FindingsIn the “Voice” treatment, the explanatory variable (VOICE) was found statistically significant, thus confirming the hypothesis that democracy, through having a voice in the decision-making process, affects compliance positively. As for the “Empathy” treatment, the explanatory variable (EMPATHY) was also found significant. This confirms the second hypothesis that triggering feelings of empathy, through highlighting the good cause behind public spending that uses taxpayers' money, affects compliance behavior positively.Research limitations/implicationsDespite the fact that the experimental methodology is a methodology with high internal validity, examining the impact of a specific intervention on behavior, a replication of the experiment in other contexts might be useful in increasing the external validity of the findings. Specifically, conducting this experiment on a nonstudent sample might lead to even more powerful results by increasing the ecological validity of the results.Practical implicationsThis study advocates a more behaviorally informed public policy. Specifically, Egyptian policymakers are recommended to adopt behavioral nudges as a complement to existing policies. The authors believe the findings, if confirmed by repeated experiments (lab, lab-in-the-field and rational choice theories on both student and non-student samples) in a number of Arab countries, might also help in offering cost-effective nudges for the Arab world policymakers, where culture and the political context are to a great extent similar.Social implicationsThe findings of the study have a number of social implications. Higher tax compliance will enable higher levels of public spending on a number of social targets such as education, health and welfare programs.Originality/valueWhile the study builds on recent research examining how to incentivize tax compliance, it simultaneously seeks to make three contributions. First, the study design aims to apply recent advances in behavioral sciences (impact of voice and empathy) in a policy area that has not seen much use of such interventions in the Egyptian context (i.e. tax compliance). Second, the study is policy relevant in the sense that it aims to increase the effectiveness of existing government policies by complementing them with behavioral primes. Third, there is nearly no literature found applying this topic in a non-WEIRD country such as Egypt.

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“…We perform a journalistic and scholar literature review that characterizes the behavior of these third-party political movements as political machines: “organizations, headed by a single boss or a small autocratic group, which controls enough votes to sustain political and administrative control of a city, county, or state” (Zimmer, 2015, p. 363) (See also: Stokes et al , 2013; and Scott, 1962). This is a context where, on the one hand, citizens do not electorally punish political machines, and on the other, clientelism acquires a particular local expression (Mansour et al , 2021; Robinson, 2016; Eaton and Chambers, 2014; Eaton, 2006; Eduardo and Muñloz, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political machines and the curse of public resources in subnational democracies

Cendales

Garza

Arcila

2021

JES

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PurposeThis paper argues that decentralization reforms in Colombia, implemented since the 1980s, have led to the decentralization of political clientelism rather than its demise. Clientelism is a system of political and economic institutions that turns every local democracy into an extractive political institution. The authors theoretically demonstrate that an increase in public resources will increase corruption.Design/methodology/approachThe authors develop and test a subnational public choice model, where clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration constitute a stable long-term institutional equilibrium. The model comprises two linked subgames: electoral tournament and corruption in public policy. The model makes two predictions that currently oppose predominant approaches: (1) increasing the severity of jail sentences to electoral crimes increases their price and the predominance of machine politics, instead of improving the quality of electoral tournaments and (2) increasing local governments' public finance increases clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration.FindingsThe authors find evidence in favor of the theoretical model of curse of public resources, using difference-in-differences estimation with a database 2016–17 of Colombia's 1,034 municipalities. This country is well-suited for our analysis because it has a long-term commitment to formal democratic processes (since 1958), while plagued by endemic corruption and clientelism problems.Originality/value(1) The theoretical approach is innovative and disruptive of current models on the problem, (2) the model builds upon the Colombian situation, a country with prominent corruption and political violence problems regardless of its relatively long-term commitment with free elections (since 1958) and (3) the theoretical discussion is tested using a comprehensive set of difference-in-differences estimations.

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How do electoral and voice accountability affect corruption? Experimental evidence from Egypt

Cited by 8 publications

References 51 publications

Corrupción: ampliando el alcance

Corrupción: ampliando el alcance

How can tax compliance be incentivized? An experimental examination of voice and empathy

Political machines and the curse of public resources in subnational democracies

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