How does OPEC allocate quotas?

Gault, John; Spierer, Charles; Bertholet, Jean-Luc; Karbassioun, Bahman

doi:10.1016/s1085-7443(99)00007-1

Cited by 19 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…To date, the literature has made some important first steps in analyzing the determinants of OPEC quotas (e.g. Alsalem et al, 1997;Gault et al, 1999). But we do not find a single paper in the peer-review literature that analyzes investment decisions regarding installed capacity in OPEC nations.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 91%

Determinants of OPEC production: Implications for OPEC behavior

et al. 2008

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 91%

Determinants of OPEC production: Implications for OPEC behavior

et al. 2008

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“…(3) Developing countries confronted with terrorism activities may be motivated to enhance export volumes in a bid to increase the incremental government budget needed to combat underlying terrorists' activities. This explanation is based on the fact that countries in the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) produce far lower than their full capacities (Gault et al 1999).…”

Section: Further Discussion On Conditional and Unconditional Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural Resource Exports, Foreign Aid and Terrorism

Asongu

2019

SSRN Journal

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Linkages between foreign aid, terrorism and natural resource (fuel and iron ore) exports are investigated in this study. The focus is on 78 developing countries with data for the period 1984 to 2008. The generalised method of moment is employed as empirical strategy. Three main foreign aid variables are used for the analysis, namely: bilateral aid, multilateral aid and total aid. The corresponding terrorism variables employed are: domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism, unclear terrorism and total terrorism. The following findings are established. First, the criteria informing the validity of specifications corresponding to iron ore exports do not hold. Second, there is evidence of convergence in fuel exports. Third, whereas the unconditional impacts of aid dynamics are not significant, the unconditional impacts of terrorism dynamics are consistently positive on fuel exports. Fourth, the interaction between terrorism and aid dynamics consistently display negative signs, with corresponding modifying aid thresholds within respective ranges. Unexpected signs are elicited and policy implications discussed. Given the unexpected results, an extended analysis is performed in which net effects are computed. These net effects are constitutive of the unconditional effect from terrorism and the conditional impacts from the interaction between foreign aid and terrorism dynamics. Based on the extended analysis, bilateral aid and total aid modulate terrorism dynamics to induce net positive effects on fuel exports while multilateral aid moderates terrorism dynamics to engender negative net effects on fuel exports. The research improves extant knowledge on nexuses between resources, terrorism and foreign aid. JEL Classification: F40; F23; F35; Q34; O40

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“…Smith (2005) shows evidence that none of these hypotheses are correct, although he does hypothesize an alternative: that OPEC is a bureaucratic production syndicate that allocates quotas but which faces high costs in deciding on those quotas. However, as far as collusive quotas are concerned, Gault et al (1999) could not firmly establish a single statistically significant model for how the assignment of quotas is done within OPEC.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%