How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism: Philosophical Misconceptions About Methodological Naturalism

Abstract

In recent controversies about Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC), the principle of methodological naturalism (MN) has played an important role. In this paper, an often neglected distinction is made between two different conceptions of MN, each with its respective rationale and with a different view on the proper role of MN in science. According to one popular conception, MN is a self-imposed or intrinsic limitation of science, which means that science is simply not equipped to deal with claims of the supernatural (Intrinsic MN or IMN). Alternatively, we will defend MN as a provisory and empirically grounded attitude of scientists, which is justified in virtue of the consistent success of naturalistic explanations and the lack of success of supernatural explanations in the history of science. (Provisory MN or PMN). Science does have a bearing on supernatural hypotheses, and its verdict is uniformly negative. We will discuss five arguments that have been proposed in support of IMN: the argument from the definition of science, the argument from lawful regularity, the science stopper argument, the argument from procedural necessity, and the testability argument. We conclude that IMN, because of its philosophical flaws, proves to be an ill-advised strategy to counter the claims of IDC. Evolutionary scientists are on firmer ground if they discard supernatural explanations on purely evidential grounds, instead of ruling them out by philosophical fiat.

Beyond Physics? On the Prospects of Finding a Meaningful Oracle

“…After all, the intelligent designer may be a physical entity in a larger physical world, who created a kind of subworld analogous to a computer simulation. This is a common theme in science fiction (Lem 1999;Banks 2004), which prompts interesting philosophical questions about the concept of the supernatural (Boudry et al 2010). While some evidence of cosmic design is necessary to support the notion of a supernatural designer analogous to a "Great Programmer" (Edis 2002), it still is not sufficient to directly address the question of whether such a scenario must lie beyond the limits of physics.…”

Grist to the Mill of Anti-evolutionism: The Failed Strategy of Ruling the Supernatural Out of Science by Philosophical Fiat

“…With such a dismal track record, 5 Before resorting to supernatural causes, we should of course make sure to eliminate all available natural ones, especially in view of the fact that all such recourses have invariably turned out premature. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to conceive of some extraordinary event that leaves all natural explanations impotent, (examples provided in Boudry, et al 2010), and that can be elegantly explained by some supernatural hypothesis. In such cases, or so we argue, supernatural explanations would be warranted.…”

“…This view has provoked some philosophical discussion about the correct understanding of methodological naturalism and its proper role in science. 2 In an earlier publication (Boudry, Blancke, & Braeckman 2010), we proposed a distinction between two conceptions of methodological naturalism, with two respective views on the limits of science and the proper role of naturalism in its methods.…”

“…In our previous paper (Boudry, et al 2010), we reviewed five philosophical arguments in favour of IMN, among which the claim that supernatural phenomena are intrinsically untestable, that the supernatural is a science stopper, that scientific evidence for it is procedurally or conceptually impossible, and that allowing the supernatural would completely destroy the stability of science. Although we found some merit in these arguments, we concluded that none of them provide sufficient ground for IMN, i.e.…”

La opción naturalista. Una respuesta a Francisco Soler

“…Finalmente, introducir el sobrenaturalismo en la ciencia proporcionaría pocas ventajas epistemológicas al modo resultante de explicación de lo real. ¿Cómo saber, por ejemplo, cuándo está justificado y 8 Esta última línea de defensa del naturalismo metodológico es la preferida de algunos naturalistas, como Giere (2010) y Boudry et al (2010). No coincido, sin embargo, con estos últimos autores en que la defensa que he presentado de lo que ellos designan como "Naturalismo Metodológico Intrínseco" ofrezca las dificultades que ellos creen ver en ella.…”