How to Solve the Puzzle of Dion and Theon Without Losing Your Head

Abstract

The ancient puzzle of Dion and Theon has given rise to a surprising array of apparently implausible views. For example, in order to solve the puzzle, several philosophers have been led to deny the existence of their own feet, others have denied that objects can gain and lose parts, and large numbers of philosophers have embraced the thesis that distinct objects can occupy the same space, having all their material parts in common. In this paper, I argue for an alternative approach: I claim that human beings have ordinary parts—hands, heads, feet, and so on—but no extraordinary parts, such as ‘foot-complements’, the existence of which is essential to the puzzle. I rebut three objections to this approach: an objection that it is unacceptably metaphysically arbitrary, an objection that the view is incompatible with versions of the puzzle involving decapitation, and an objection concerning masses of matter. If we can believe that there are such things as hands and feet without involving ourselves in paradox, and without accepting large numbers of co-located material objects that share all their material parts, then that is what we should do. My view is the only known alternative which allows this.

Ordinary undetached parts

“…So the proponent of the conservative solution needs a different approach here. Carmichael (2020) recently offered a clever solution to the problem posed by Dion's beheading. He suggests that certain things inside Dion's head, such as blood cells and an electrical current, are merely contained in Dion's head but not parts of Dion's head (just like the fish in a fishbowl are contained in that fishbowl without being parts of it).…”

“…Finally, for those who endorse the psychological criterion of identity, it can be retained by adopting Carmichael's (2020) solution to the problem of Dion's beheading, which I described in Section 3. If Carmichael is right that certain things in Dion's head, like blood cells, are parts of Dion but not parts of his head, then Dion's beheading is unlike cases (1)-( 7).…”

“…For discussion of this objection, seeOlson (1995),Jaworski (2016),Carmichael (2020), andYang (2022). Cf Korman's (2010Korman's ( , 2015…”

“…Chisholm (1976) defends mereological essentialism and applies it to a related problem (ibid: 157-158) Carmichael (2020). notes that Chisholm's view can solve the puzzle of Dion and Theon in particular.…”

A Phasalist Approach to Coincidence Puzzles

“…First, Carmichael (2020) hypothesizes that the blood cells and electrical current in the head are parts of the human organism but not parts of the organism's head. (They may be contained in the head, but they are not parts of the head.)…”