Hurting hurts more than helping helps

Offerman, Theo

doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00176-3

Cited by 249 publications

(200 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Charness and R.abin (2002) distinguish neg~tive reciprocity games, games where other-regarding behavior has a punishment flavor to it (such as ultimaturn and other bargaining games), from positive reciprocity games, games where other-regarding behavior has areward flavor to it (such as dictator and trust games). Attribution-based behavior was found to be significant only in negative reciprocity games (also see Bolton et al 1998;Offerman 2002). Some studies conciude that the response to fair or centJy, >.…”

Section: Gq/ry E Bolton/ele= K~tok/ A~el Ockenfels {B) Procedwral Mpectmentioning

confidence: 96%

Trust among Internet Traders

Bolton¹,

Katok²,

Ockenfels³

2004

Analyse &Amp; Kritik

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Standard economic theory does not capture trust a mong anonymous Internet tra ders. But w hen traders are allowed to have social preferences , u ncertainty about a seller's morals opens t he door for trust, reward, exploitation and reputation building. We report experiments suggesting that sellers' intrinsic m otivations to be trustworthy are not sufficient to sustain tra d e w hen not complemented by a feedb ack system. We demons trate that it is the interac tion of sodal preferences and cleverly designed reputa tion mechanisms that solves to a large extent the trust problern on Internet market platforms . How ever, economic theory and sodal preference mo dels te nd to underestimate the difficulties of promoting trust in anonymous online trading communities.

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Section: Gq/ry E Bolton/ele= K~tok/ A~el Ockenfels {B) Procedwral Mpectmentioning

confidence: 96%

Trust among Internet Traders

Bolton¹,

Katok²,

Ockenfels³

2004

Analyse &Amp; Kritik

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“…We test this possibility by conducting a panel analysis within each treatment. Table 4 reports the estimation results of different panel models, where the dependent variable in all specifications 26 It is possible that the relationship between "reciprocity" (adjustment) and "kindness" (effort gap or outcome gap) is not linear (Baumeister et al, 2001;Offerman, 2002;Andreoni et al, 2003;Charness, 2004;Bellemare et al, 2007). Bellemare et al (2007), for example, suggest that reciprocity is a concave function of kindness (i.e.…”

Section: Effortmentioning

confidence: 99%

Principal–Agent Settings with Random Shocks

Rubin

Sheremeta

2016

Management Science

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Using a gift exchange experiment, we show that the ability of reciprocity to overcome incentive problems inherent in principal-agent settings is greatly reduced when the agent's effort is distorted by random shocks and transmitted imperfectly to the principal. Specifically, we find that gift exchange contracts without shocks encourage effort and wages well above standard predictions. However, the introduction of random shocks reduces wages and effort, regardless of whether the shocks can be observed by the principal. Moreover, the introduction of shocks significantly reduces the probability of fulfilling the contract by the agent, the payoff of the principal, and total welfare. Therefore, our findings demonstrate that random shocks place an important bound on the ability of gift exchange to overcome principal-agent problems.JEL Classifications: C72, C91, D63, D81, H50

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“…There is clear evidence for the process view in ex-ante evaluations (Blount 1995;Bolton et al 2005;Bolton and Ockenfels 2010). In ex-post evaluations, outcome fairness is more frequent although there is also some evidence for process fairness (Charness 2004;Cox and Deck 2005;Offerman 2002;van den Bos et al 1997). These separate findings, if combined, suggest that dynamic inconsistencies will be common in fairness evaluations.…”

Section: The Danger Of Dynamic Inconsistency For Fairness Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%