<i>Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning</i>

Brown, Jessica

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.x

Cited by 165 publications

(108 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…É mesmo necessário conhecer p para agir com base em p? Eis aqui um caso apresentado por Jessica Brown (2008) que talvez esclareça melhor a questão:…”

Section: Ações De Conhecimento?unclassified

O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?

Engel

2017

Veritas

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RESUMO:Neste artigo examino a possibilidade de agência no domínio epistêmico -a visão compartilhada por muitos filósofos de que possamos ser ativos, ao invés de passivos, em relação às nossas crenças e manifestações de conhecimento. Concluo que a noção de agência epistêmica é plausível apenas em sentido indireto, referindose as diferentes ações que realizamos com intuito de melhorar nossos compromissos epistêmicos. Trata-se de um tipo de agência prática, como qualquer agência, mas que não nos autoriza a pensar que possamos estar agindo de alguma maneira quando cremos ou conhecemos. Palavras-chave: Agência; Racionalidade Epistêmica; Racionalidade Prática; Conhecimento. ABSTRACT:In this paper, I examine the possibility of agency in the epistemic domain -the view shared by many philosophers that we can be active, rather than passive, in relation to our beliefs and knowledge. I conclude that the notion of epistemic agency is plausible only in an indirect sense, referring to the different actions we take to improve our epistemic commitments. It is a kind of practical agency, like any agency, which does not allow us to think that we can be acting in any way when we believe or know.

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“…É mesmo necessário conhecer p para agir com base em p? Eis aqui um caso apresentado por Jessica Brown (2008) que talvez esclareça melhor a questão:…”

Section: Ações De Conhecimento?unclassified

O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?

Engel

2017

Veritas

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“…2 The above knowledge norms specify a necessary condition for epistemic propriety. As Jessica Brown [2008] observes, that's not the same thing as knowledge being necessary and sufficient. I endorse the latter interpretation of the knowledge norms: knowledge is the epistemic standard to meet.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Ways to Put Knowledge First

Jackson

2012

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…15 One might suggest that in some cases the epistemic objection isn't unproblematically incorrect, but if SSI were true, we would expect it would be. Couldn't we revise some of Jessica Brown's (2008a) cases (e.g., SURGEON or AFFAIR) to come up with what are at least not unproblematically incorrect epistemic objections? If so, isn't this just as much trouble for SSI as the absence of unproblematically correct epistemic objections is for moderate invariantism?…”

Section: Moderate Invariantismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Purposes of Knowledge-Attribution and the Contextualism Debate

McGrath¹

2015

Epistemic Evaluation

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In this chapter, we follow Edward Craig's (1990) advice: ask what the concept of knowledge does for us and use our findings as clues about its application conditions. What a concept does for us is a matter of what we can do with it, and what we do with concepts is deploy them in thought and language. So, we will examine the purposes we have in attributing knowledge. This chapter examines two such purposes, agentevaluation and informant-suggestion, and brings the results to bear on an important debate about the application conditions of the concept of knowledge-the debate between contextualists and their rivals.

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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning

Cited by 165 publications

References 17 publications

O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?

O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?

Two Ways to Put Knowledge First

Two Purposes of Knowledge-Attribution and the Contextualism Debate

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