Identifying phenomenal consciousness

Schier, Elizabeth

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.04.001

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 48 publications

(80 reference statements)

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“…Using quality spaces, this question then becomes: how could we determine if such quality spaces are present when not being reported? Schier () suggests that we look for evidence of identity between phenomenal qualities and neural activation. To see how, we need to introduce another tool—that of a neural activation space.…”

Section: Alternative Measures Of Experience Without Reportmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If a neural activation space and a particular quality space bear the same similarity relations, then for every point in the quality space, there will be a corresponding point in the activation space and for every relationship in the quality space, there will be a corresponding relationship in the activation space. In other words, the spaces will be isomorphic (O'Brien & Opie, ; Schier, , p. 218). From this, we end up with the prediction that each quality space will have an isomorphic neural activation space.…”

Section: Alternative Measures Of Experience Without Reportmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…From this, we end up with the prediction that each quality space will have an isomorphic neural activation space. While this prediction is not currently testable, it is testable in principle (see Schier, for more details). Should sufficient evidence for this be acquired, then an examination of consciousness in the absence of report via neural activation spaces would be justified.…”

Section: Alternative Measures Of Experience Without Reportmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How to operationalise consciousness

Carruthers

Carls-Diamante²,

Huang³

et al. 2019

Australian Journal of Psychology

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Objective: To review the way consciousness is operationalised in contemporary research, discuss strengths and weaknesses of current approaches and propose new measures. Method: We first reviewed the literature pertaining to the phenomenal character of visual and self-consciousness as well as awareness of visual stimuli. We also reviewed more problematic cases of dreams and animal consciousness, specifically that of octopuses. Results: Despite controversies, work in visual and self-consciousness is highly developed and there are notable successes. Cases where experiences are not induced, such as dreams, and where no verbal report is possible, such as when we study purported experiences of octopuses, are more challenging. It is difficult to be confident about the reliability and validity of operationalisations of dreams.Although this is a general concern about the measuring consciousness, it is not a sufficiently severe concern to completely undermine the work reviewed on vision and self-consciousness. It is more difficult to see how the good work on human psychology can be applied to non-human animals, especially those with radically different nervous systems, such as octopuses. Given the limitations of report-based operationalisations of consciousness, it is desirable to develop non-report-based measures, particularly for phenomenal qualities. We examine a number of possibilities and offer two possible approaches of varying degrees of practicality, the first based on combining quality space descriptions of phenomenal qualities and the notion of a "neural activation space" inherited from connectionist A.I., the second being a novel match to target approach. Conclusion: Consciousness is a multi-faceted phenomenon and requires a variety of operationalisations to be studied.

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Section: Alternative Measures Of Experience Without Reportmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Alternative Measures Of Experience Without Reportmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Alternative Measures Of Experience Without Reportmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

How to operationalise consciousness

Carruthers

Carls-Diamante²,

Huang³

et al. 2019

Australian Journal of Psychology

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“…At this time merely pure speculations are possible concerning the character of such neuronal activities although impressive progress has been made in recent years (see review Schier, 2009; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Continuation of these research projects by combining neurophysiological with behavioral studies may lead to a better understanding of the physiological properties and functions of this state.…”

Section: Properties Of Reacog Being Characterized By Applying Other Lmentioning

confidence: 99%

How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network

Cruse¹,

Schilling²

2013

Front. Psychol.

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An artificial neural network called reaCog is described which is based on a decentralized, reactive and embodied architecture developed to control non-trivial hexapod walking in an unpredictable environment (Walknet) while using insect-like navigation (Navinet). In reaCog, these basic networks are extended in such a way that the complete system, reaCog, adopts the capability of inventing new behaviors and – via internal simulation – of planning ahead. This cognitive expansion enables the reactive system to be enriched with additional procedures. Here, we focus on the question to what extent properties of phenomena to be characterized on a different level of description as for example consciousness can be found in this minimally cognitive system. Adopting a monist view, we argue that the phenomenal aspect of mental phenomena can be neglected when discussing the function of such a system. Under this condition, reaCog is discussed to be equipped with properties as are bottom-up and top-down attention, intentions, volition, and some aspects of Access Consciousness. These properties have not been explicitly implemented but emerge from the cooperation between the elements of the network. The aspects of Access Consciousness found in reaCog concern the above mentioned ability to plan ahead and to invent and guide (new) actions. Furthermore, global accessibility of memory elements, another aspect characterizing Access Consciousness is realized by this network. reaCog allows for both reactive/automatic control and (access-) conscious control of behavior. We discuss examples for interactions between both the reactive domain and the conscious domain. Metacognition or Reflexive Consciousness is not a property of reaCog. Possible expansions are discussed to allow for further properties of Access Consciousness, verbal report on internal states, and for Metacognition. In summary, we argue that already simple networks allow for properties of consciousness if leaving the phenomenal aspect aside.

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“…So it seems that it is not possible to get data speaking to the purported independence of phenomenal qualities from access. Schier (2009) has recently reviewed and defended a suggestion regarding how to find evidence that phenomenal qualities are independent of access (compare O'Brien and Opie 1999a). If we can find evidence that there are neural structures that are isomorphic to phenomenal spaces then we will have found evidence to support their identity.…”

Section: Challenges Facing Scientific Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%