Ideological belief bias with political syllogisms

Calvillo, Dustin P.; Swan, Alexander B.; Rutchick, Abraham M.

doi:10.1080/13546783.2019.1688188

Cited by 16 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…This result is in contrast with studies showing that an individuals' ideology often interferes with their normative judgments as they endorse politically congruent arguments and reject politically incongruent arguments (Aspernäs et al, 2022;Calvillo et al, 2020;Čavojová et al, 2018;Gampa et al, 2019). The lack of belief bias and reliable intuitive statistics effect in the climate and vaccine deniers together suggests that not only are individuals aware of normative rules, but also they spontaneously incorporate appropriate rules in their judgments.…”

Section: The Lack Of Belief Bias Among Scepticscontrasting

confidence: 82%

“…Belief bias studies have shown that the conflict between normative rules and political beliefs interferes with rule-based judgments (Aspernäs et al, 2022;Calvillo et al, 2020;Čavojová et al, 2018;Gampa et al, 2019). The aim of Experiment 1 is to examine if conflict causes a comparable interference effect in belief judgments.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Prior abortion attitude was the strongest predictor of this bias, even after controlling for experience in deductive logic. Calvillo et al (2020) revealed that, when individuals are asked to judge the logical validity of political syllogisms, their political beliefs (e.g., regarding climate change) impacted their logical judgments, as politically congruent arguments were endorsed more frequently than incongruent ones. Similar findings were reported on issues such as asylum for refugees in a sample of Swedish participants (Aspernäs et al, 2022).…”

Section: Beliefs Interfere In Rule-based Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do Statistical Rules Interfere with Political Beliefs?

Ghasemi,

Roberts,

Handley

2022

Preprint

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Recent studies have shown that individuals heavily rely on their own political attitudes and thus underweight appropriate evidence or normative rules. Such an effect of prior beliefs on reasoning is assumed as evidence of ideological blindness and reasoning impairment. Across 3 preregistered experiments (N = 1030), we examined whether individuals are truly insensitive to evidence inconsistent with their political views. Participants, including climate believers and deniers (Experiments 1 and 2), and pro- and anti-vaxxers (Experiment 3), were presented with a series of base-rate arguments with neutral, climate, or COVID-19 vaccine contents and were asked to evaluate them either based on their beliefs or statistical rules. The results showed that climate deniers and anti-vaxxers were not impacted by their political beliefs in their reasoning as the conflict between statistical rules (i.e., base-rates) and diagnostic information did not interfere with their statistical judgments. More importantly, regardless of an argument’s content, such a conflict interfered with belief-based judgments. These findings contradict the notion that ideology impairs reasoning and suggest that individuals’ judgments are less impacted by background beliefs than has been assumed previously, and more importantly, reasoners are still sensitive to normative rules that disagree with their beliefs, even on ideological topics.

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Section: The Lack Of Belief Bias Among Scepticscontrasting

confidence: 82%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Beliefs Interfere In Rule-based Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do Statistical Rules Interfere with Political Beliefs?

Ghasemi,

Roberts,

Handley

2022

Preprint

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“…The authors have registered direct effect of political group identity on reasoning, but the cognitive sophistication did not magnify this effect. Previous studies such as Calvillo et al (2020) have analyzed ideological beliefs bias using syllogisms containing political content. Participants (from two ideologies: conservatives and liberals) had to judge the validity of the conclusions presented.…”

Section: Heuristics Biases and Reasoning In Everyday Contextsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heuristics, Biases and the Psychology of Reasoning: State of the Art

Martin¹,

Valiña²

2023

PSYCH

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Investigations on heuristics and biases have had a great impact on the study of reasoning and related higher cognitive processes, such as judgment and decision making. Specifically, the research in cognitive psychology of reasoning has revealed that people frequently activate mental shortcuts, or heuristics, to make inferences. These are non-logical strategies and could lead subjects to commit systematic deviations from the tenets of normative principles, that is, cognitive biases. The key objective of this paper is to present some of the most relevant theories on heuristics and biases in reasoning, focusing on the dual process theories of deduction. According to these theories, there are two kinds of thinking. Type 1, automatic, unconscious, implicit, fast and effortless and Type 2, reflective, controlled, conscious, explicit, slow and effortful. Much debate on these theories has emphasized on the relationship between both types of processes and the underlying factors that could triggered one or other. In this regard, different dual-process theories propose distinct answers to these questions. The results in the literature have registered that the likelihood of activation of Type 1 and Type 2 processes has important consequences on reasoning, both in experimental laboratory tasks and in everyday situations. Recent empirical investigations that have studied the critical role that intuitive and deliberative processes play in different professional areas are displayed. It is a key question that future research continues with the study of the underlying procedures that professionals activate for reasoning and decision making.

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“…While this capacity is a fundamental tool for human conduct (Vygotsky & Luria, 1993), it is imperfect. The study of human reasoning in the context of deduction and logical inference has shown that our reasoning is fragile, drawn by biases and directed by heuristics (Calvillo et al, 2020;Wilkins, 1929). typically studied using a production or evaluation task.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Response Patterns to a Syllogistic Categorical Reasoning Task with Abstract Groups

Olop¹,

Kikas²

2022

JEDP

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The current study examined response patterns of young adults (N = 861) to a particular syllogism with abstract categories that contained the fallacy of the undistributed middle. Participants had to evaluate all given conclusions. Results showed that, despite being invalid, conclusions that used the word “some” were more likely to be selected as valid or possible compared to conclusions that used “all” or “none”. In addition, we also analyzed participants’ solutions to the task at the individual level (i.e., all evaluations to conclusions that contained the end terms). The aim was to detect dominant patterns. Results showed five dominant patterns. The significance of these findings and limitations are discussed.

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Ideological belief bias with political syllogisms

Cited by 16 publications

References 46 publications

Do Statistical Rules Interfere with Political Beliefs?

Do Statistical Rules Interfere with Political Beliefs?

Heuristics, Biases and the Psychology of Reasoning: State of the Art

Response Patterns to a Syllogistic Categorical Reasoning Task with Abstract Groups

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